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The growth in online consumer spending was one of the few positive
signs in an overall weak U.S. economy in 2008-2009, often outpacing brick-
and-mortar stores.' The continued expansion of internet access on a variety
of hand-held devices 2 and increased consumer ease and confidence in online
purchasing 3 played important roles in this economic bright spot. In
undertaking these online transactions, millions of consumers each day simply
click on "I Agree" to a site's standard terms of use, often without reading or
understanding the terms and conditions of their purchases. 4 As online
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1 Press Release, comScore, Inc., Despite Weak Season, Online Spending Trends
Outperform Brick-And-Mortar Across Several Key Retail Categories (Jan. 2, 2009),
available at http://www.comscore.com/PressEvents/PressReleases/2009/I/Online_
SpendingOutperforms_Brick-and-Mortar.
2 Rachel Metz, EBay: Holiday Cell Phone Shopping up Threefold, ASSOCIATED
PREss, Dec. 28, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/technology/wirestory?id=9433458 (last
visited, Nov. 29, 2010). The online auction site, eBay, reported that six million people
have added eBay's applications to their iPhones with two million visits each day to eBay
from mobile applications. Id. In 2009, eBay consumers undertook approximately $500
million worth of transactions on their cell phones. Id. See Stephen E. Friedman,
Protecting Consumers from Arbitration Provisions in Cyberspace, the Federal
Arbitration Act and E-Sign Notwithstanding, 57 CATH. U. L. REv. 377, 394-409 (2008)
(questioning whether online contracts, especially those on tiny cell phone screens, truly
qualify as "written" agreements as intended under the Federal Arbitration Act); infra
notes 4, 63-64 and accompanying text.
3 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
4 Shmuel I. Becher, Asymmetric Information in Consumer Contracts. The Challenge
that Is Yet to Be Met, 45 AM. Bus. L.J. 723, 726-27, 733-34, 742-43 (2008); Friedman,
supra note 2, at 378; Erin Ann O'Hara, Choice of Law for Internet Transactions: The
Uneasy Case for Online Consumer Protection, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 1883, 1920-21 (2005);
Robert A. Hillman, Online Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Website Disclosure of E-
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consumer activities continue to grow, more consumers in the U.S. are
challenging the dispute resolution clauses in these non-negotiable clickwrap
agreements when conflicts arise. 5 However, consumers face formidable
obstacles when seeking to challenge online dispute resolution clauses
because state courts largely sustain these clauses under traditional common
law notions of the duty to read agreements, freedom of contract, and mutual
assent between the parties.6 Furthermore, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)
Standard Terms Backfire?, 104 MICH. L. REv. 837, 839-40 (2006); Nancy S. Kim,
Clicking and Cringing, 86 OR. L. REv. 797, 810 (2007). See Ty Tasker & Daryn Pakcyk,
Cyber-Surfing on the High Seas of Legalese: Law and Technology of Internet
Agreements, 18 ALB. L.J. SCi. & TECH. 79, 105-10 (2008) (contending that courts and
lawyers fail to fully grasp the impact of website design on user reading and
comprehension of clickwrap terms of use); Omri Ben-Shahar, The Myth of the
"Opportunity to Read" in Contract Law 1-2, 17-19 (University of Chicago John M. Olin
Program On Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 415 2d Series, 2008); infra notes 263-65,
269 and accompanying text.
5 The term "clickwrap" agreements refers to online contracts in which the consumer
or user must click on "I Agree" in order to indicate party assent to the standardized terms
and conditions before the transaction or download can continue. JOSEPH M. PERILLO,
CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS 64-65 (6th ed. 2009); Jane K. Winn & Brian H.
Bix, Diverging Perspectives on Electronic Contracting in the US. and EU, 54 CLEV. ST.
L. REV. 175, 176-77 (2006). In a 2007 study of fifty-eight lawsuits involving clickwrap
contracts, the study's author found that most initial legal challenges focused on six key
aspects of these contracts of adhesion: choice of forum, choice of law, mandatory
arbitration, software licensing and service terms, and liability limits. Nathan J. Davis,
Note, Presumed Assent: The Judicial Acceptance of Clickwrap, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
577, 589 (2007). See infra notes 6, 18, 84-117, 126-208 and accompanying text.
6 See, e.g., Guadagno v. E*Trade Bank, 592 F. Supp. 2d 1263 (C.D. Cal. 2008)
(finding that an arbitration clause containing a class action waiver is not unconscionable
and not a contract of adhesion as the account holder in the online investment service had
clear notice of and clicked assent to a sixty day opt-out provision); In re Jamster Mktg.
Litig., No. 05cv0819 JM(CAB), 2008 WL 4858506 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2008) (finding
that a class action waiver contained in a reasonable and clear arbitration provision is not
unconscionable under applicable Maryland, Mississippi, and Illinois laws, when the
provisions compel arbitration of consumers' claims concerning deceptive business
practices in free ringtone marketing scheme); A.V. v. iParadigms, 544 F. Supp. 2d 473
(E.D. Va. 2008) (finding minors had entered into valid clickwrap agreement and
indicated their assent to be bound by clicking on the "I Agree" that appeared directly
below online terms of use); Feldman v. Google, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 229 (E.D. Pa.
2007) (upholding mandatory arbitration in forum-selection clause); Omstead v. Dell
Corp., 473 F. Supp. 2d 1018 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (finding that, in an online computer
purchase, an arbitration clause with a class action waiver is not substantively
unconscionable under Texas law); In re RealNetworks, Inc. Privacy Litig., No. 00 C
1366, 2000 WL 631341 (N.D. Ill. May 8, 2000) (upholding a mandatory arbitration
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favors arbitration agreements 7 while the Electronic Signatures in Global and
National Commerce Act (E-SIGN) treats electronic agreements the same as
written ones. 8 Although E-SIGN puts forth some basic disclosure and
clause); Forrest v. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc., 805 A.2d 1007, 1011 (D.C. 2002) (upholding
a state of Virginia forum selection clause that is reasonably communicated to consumers
in clickwrap agreement as to font, size, appearance of terms, and opportunity to read in
advance); Hubbert v. Dell Corp., 835 N.E.2d 113 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005), appeal denied, 844
N.E.2d 965 (2006) (finding a conspicuous arbitration clause with only discretionary
authority to charge the losing party costs and attorneys' fees was not unconscionable in
an online computer purchase); Caspi v. Microsoft Network, 732 A.2d 528 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1999) (upholding a Washington forum selection clause where the website
prompted potential subscribers to read the terms of use in advance and permitted
consumers to click on "I Agree" to show mutual assent). But see DeFontes v. Dell, Inc.,
984 A.2d 1061, 1072-73 (R.I. 2009) (refusing to compel arbitration because the
arbitration clause stating that the return of products acts as rejection of clickwrap and
shrinkwrap agreements was too confusing). See generally, William J. Condon, Jr.,
Electronic Assent to Online Contracts: Do Courts Consistently Enforce Clickwrap
Agreements?, 16 REGENT U. L. REv. 433, 454-57 (2004) (discussing online contracts of
adhesion as prima facie valid once a user clicks on "I Agree").
7 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). The FAA puts arbitration agreements on an equal footing with
other contracts so that they may be struck down only on recognized legal or equitable
grounds applicable to other contracts. Section 2 states that:
[a] written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter
arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any
part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing
controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract.
Id.
8 15 U.S.C. § 7001(a) (2006). E-SIGN indicates that:
with respect to any transaction in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce-
(1) a signature, contract, or other record relating to such transaction may not be
denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely because it is in electronic form;
and
(2) a contract relating to such transaction may not be denied legal effect,
validity, or enforceability solely because an electronic signature or electronic record
was used in its formation.
Id. Unlike the FAA, E-SIGN provides some minimal consumer protections concerning
issues of assent, including requirements for affirmative assent to the clickwrap's terms
and conditions, and clear and conspicuous statements regarding access to the online
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affirmative consent requirements, neither of these laws provide any
minimum standards for dispute resolution clauses in clickwrap agreements. 9
While courts have generally accepted the notion that consumers may
legally enter into clickwrap agreements, 10 recent legal contests involving
contract in paper form. Id. § 7001(c). See Friedman, supra note 2, at 422-23. However,
these provisions do not mandate any procedural or substantive components of adhesive
dispute resolution clauses. 15 U.S.C. § 7001(c) (2006). See Friedman, supra note 2, at
422-23.
9 Friedman, supra note 2, at 378-79. The provisions of the proposed Uniform
Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA) concerning transactions in computer
software will not be discussed in this article because only two states, Maryland and
Virginia, approved the law, and efforts to seek additional state passage were suspended in
August, 2003. Winn & Bix, supra note 5, at 180; Patrick Thibodeau, Anti-UCITA Legal
Measures Outnumber State Adoptions, COMPUTERWORLD.COM, June 9, 2003,
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/81884/AntiUCITALegalMeasuresOunumb
erState _Adoptions. Some experts criticized UCITA legislation for its lack of meaningful
consumer protection under the proposed law. Winn & Bix, supra note 5, at 180-81;
Thibodeau, supra note 9. Additionally, many states passed anti-UCITA legislation aimed
at sustaining their state consumer protection laws. Id.
10 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. It is important to note that the courts are
still uncertain about whether or not browsewrap agreements, those in which contract is
implied from merely viewing or visiting a website, meet the contract formation
requirements for mutual assent. To date, courts have tended to be more willing to enforce
browsewrap agreements against commercial parties who scraped data from other
websites and financially benefitted by violating another commercial website's terms of
use. See, e.g., Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding that
a competitor had actual knowledge of the site's terms even though it had not clicked on
the "I Agree" icon and "scraped" the WHOIS database in violation of the database's
terms of use for spamming purposes); Southwest Airlines Co. v. BoardFirst, Civ. Act.
No. 3: 06-CV-0891-B, 2007 WL 4823761 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2007) (finding that
BoardFirst violated the terms of a browsewrap agreement through its use of Southwest
Airlines' website on behalf of its customers seeking higher priority boarding passes);
Cairo, Inc. v. Crossmedia Services, Inc., No. C 04-04825 JW, 2005 WL 756610 (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 1. 2005) (upholding a browsewrap agreement after a competitor scraped data
from sites by using "robots" showing both actual and imputed knowledge of terms).
However, so far courts have rejected the enforceability of browsewrap agreements in
online consumer transactions. Waters v. Earthlink Inc., 91 F. App'x. 697 (lst Cir. 2003)
(determining that the ISP's customers are not bound by the arbitration clause due to a
lack of notice or conspicuous links on the online agreement containing the arbitration
provision); Hines v. Overstock.com, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 2d 362 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding,
under both New York (plaintiff's residence) and Utah (Overstock.com's location) laws,
no meeting of the minds because Hines had neither actual nor constructive notice of
Overstock's terms and conditions); Specht v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d
585 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff'd 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002) (finding that placement, size of
text, and mild request language are insufficient to show mutual assent to the software
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online dispute resolution clauses have often focused on issues of adequate
notice and substantive fairness. 11 Though contesting dispute resolution
clauses is not new,12 the increasing success of these actions13 marks an
important shift in judicial review of adhesive dispute resolution clauses.
California and other state courts are pushing back against rubber stamping
adhesive dispute resolution clauses, particularly arbitration provisions
previously favored under the FAA and related precedents.1 4 Despite the fact
that many argue that form dispute resolution clauses provide greater cost
savings and certainty for consumers, 15 a great number of state laws authorize
state courts to strike down arbitration clauses in clickwrap agreements as
unconscionable 16 or as directly contravening established state public
license's clickwrap arbitration clause by consumers who download free software). See
generally Christina L. Kunz, John E. Ottaviani, Elaine D. Ziff, Juliet M. Moringiello,
Kathleen M. Porter & Jennifer C. Debrow, Browse-Wrap Agreements: Validity of Implied
Assent in Electronic Form Agreements, 59 Bus. L.J. 279 (2003) (addressing contract
issues in browsewrap disputes, written by the Joint Working Group on Electronic
Contracting Practices).
11 See infra notes 84-117, 126-208 and accompanying text.
12 The presence of an arbitration clause was typically an aspect engendering
"heightened judicial scrutiny" as to the balance and fairness of contract terms in
unconscionability cases. Larry A. DiMatteo & Bruce Louis Rich, A Consent Theory of
Unconscionability: An Empirical Study of Law in Action, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1067,
1079 (2006).
13 Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of
Unconscionability, 52 BuFF. L. REV. 185, 194 (2004). As the use of standard arbitration
clauses in a variety of commercial activities has increased, so have claims that these
clauses are unconscionable. Id. In a 2002-2003 study of 235 cases with claims of
unconscionability, about 68.5% involved arbitration agreements. Id. In unconscionability
cases involving arbitration clauses, courts found 50.3% of them unconscionable as
compared to only 25.6% of non-arbitration clause cases. See infra Parts II.B, I.C, II.D,
and accompanying footnotes.
14 See infra notes 84-117, 126-208 and accompanying text.
15 Davis, supra note 5, at 578-79; Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, "Unfair" Dispute
Resolution Clauses: Much Ado about Nothing?, in BOILERPLATE: THE FOUNDATION OF
MARKET CONTRACTs 45 (Omri Ben-Shahar ed., 2007).
16 Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 15. By comparison, when standard pre-dispute
arbitration and ADR provisions are offered as a condition of offering products or services
in consumer-merchant agreements in the EU, such provisions are deemed unfair and
illegal. Council Directive 2000/3 I/EC, Directive on Electronic Commerce, 2000 O.J. (L
178) 8, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:200
0:178:0001:0016:EN:PDF [hereinafter Distance Selling Directive]. See infra notes 36-
37, 227-29 and accompanying text.
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policy.17 While some experts view this development as a lingering sign of
judicial hostility towards arbitration, 18 other commentators counter that these
cases indicate state judicial willingness to counterbalance the
disproportionate pro-arbitration stance of the Supreme Court and the federal
judiciary, 19 or the overzealous drafting of complicated and one-sided terms
17 See infra Part IL.D, and accompanying footnotes.
18 Randall, supra note 13, at 186, 196. It is important to note that some cases are
striking down choice of law or forum selection clauses, not just arbitration clauses in
clickwrap agreements, as unconscionable. See, e.g., Doe 1 v. AOL, 552 F.3d 1077 (9th
Cir. 2009) (finding that a Virginia forum selection clause preventing class actions
violates California public policy that favors consumer class actions, and is therefore
unenforceable); Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593 (E.D. Pa. 2007)
(determining that Second Life's arbitration provision requiring a venue of San Francisco,
California is unconscionable in light of the website's national presence); Comb v. PayPal,
Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1177 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (finding that an online payment
service's choice of venue for an arbitration proceeding is unconscionable under
Califomia law based on the relative circumstances of the disputing parties).
19 See, e.g., Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996) (finding
"Montana's first-page notice requirement" mandating that dispute resolution clauses be
underlined, capitalized, and on the first page of contract was in conflict with the FAA);
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995) (upholding a punitive
damages award in an arbitration proceeding, stating that there is no conflict between the
arbitration clause and New York statutory law); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,
500 U.S. 20 (1991) (finding that statutory age discrimination claims may be subject to
mandatory arbitration); Rodriguez De Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S.
477 (1989) (supporting the utilization of arbitration to resolve matters under the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1933); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482
U.S. 220 (1987) (upholding the use of arbitration for claims of fraud under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and treble damages under the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt
Organizations Act); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 615 (1985) (finding that a pre-dispute arbitration agreement for Sherman Antitrust
Act claims does not violate public policy); Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 2 (1983) (limiting the exercise of federal courts' equitable
powers when a valid arbitration agreement is in force); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417
U.S. 506 (1974) (supporting the use of the arbitration process to resolve trademark claims
under an arbitration clause in an international commercial agreement). See Jeffrey W.
Stempel, Arbitration, Unconscionability, and Equilibrium: The Return of
Unconscionability Analysis as a Counterweight to Arbitration Formalism, 19 OHIO ST. J.
ON DisP. RESOL. 757, 840-60 (2004) (tracing the historical development and decline of
the contracts doctrine of unconscionability and calling for its reemergence to counteract
excessively pro-arbitration laws and precedent). In the consumer context, some critics of
pre-dispute arbitration clauses in form consumer contracts contend that the judiciary has
shirked its responsibility to protect consumers from one-sided agreements and permitted
merchants to effectively stop consumers from pursuing their full procedural and
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of use for e-commerce clients. 20 The push-back may not be signaling an
overt hostility to arbitration and other forms of alternative dispute resolution
(ADR) or online dispute resolution (ODR), but the failures of e-businesses to
fashion ADR or ODR options that are mindful of fundamental fairness and
respect for important state consumer protection concerns.2
1
The recent case law invalidating clickwrap dispute resolution clauses is a
troubling development, not only for e-commerce businesses seeking certainty
and uniformity in transacting business over the web, 22 but for the entire
dispute resolution field. Scholars, educators, and practitioners have promoted
the positive benefits of ADR23 and ODR24 for decades. Both ADR and ODR
substantive rights in disputes. Paul D. Carrington, Regulating Dispute Resolution
Provisions in Adhesion Contracts, 35 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 225, 225-28 (1998); Lucille M.
Ponte, Boosting Consumer Confidence in E-Business: Recommendations for Establishing
Fair and Effective Dispute Resolution Programs for B2C Online Transactions, 12 ALB.
L.J. ScI. & TECH. 441, 450-51 (2002); Jeremy Senderowicz, Consumer Arbitration and
Freedom of Contract: A Proposal to Facilitate Consumers' Informed Consent to
Arbitration Clauses in Form Contracts, 32 COLuM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 275, 276-79
(1999).
20 Becher, supra note 4, at 743; O'Hara, supra note 4, at 1920-21; Tasker &
Pakcyk, supra note 4, at 143, 149. See Winn & Bix, supra note 5, at 179-80. Professor
Erin Ann O'Hara noted that:
[t]he difficulty with the process by which consumers enter into standard-form
arrangements stems from the fact that the vendor invests substantially in the
incorporation of standard terms and then presents those terms in a take-it-or-leave it
fashion to the consumer who is in a hurry to complete the transaction. The consumer
rarely actually reads the form and has no control over its contents. The standard
forms carry with them significant efficiency advantages enjoyed by both the drafter
and the consumer, but the drafter, if left completely unregulated, might have an
incentive to slip in unfairly one-sided terms.
O'Hara, supra note 4, at 1920-21 (footnotes omitted).
21 See Winn & Bix, supra note 5, at 179; supra note 16 and accompanying text.
22 LUCILLE M. PONTE & THOMAs D. CAVENAGH, CYBERJUSTICE: ONLINE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION (ODR) FOR E-COMMERCE 26-27 (Prentice Hall 2005).
23 See, e.g., ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: STRATEGIES FOR LAW AND
BusINEss 10, 27-28 (E. Wendy Trachte-Huber & Stephen K. Huber eds., 1996); MARTIN
A. FREY, ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 106-08, 206-07, 263-65
(Delmar Learning 2003); JACQUELINE M. NOLAN-HALEY, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION IN A NUTSHELL 9-11 (West Group 2001); LUCILLE M. PONTE & THOMAS D.
CAVENAGH, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN BUSINESS 31-34 (West Educational
Publishing 1999).
24 See, e.g., ETHAN KATSH & JANET RIFKIN, ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION:
RESOLVING CONFLICTS IN CYBERSPACE 21-27 (Jossey-Bass 2001); PONTE & CAVENAGH,
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are touted as saving time and expense, opening the lines of communication
between conflicting parties, aiding in reaching more collaborative party-
driven outcomes, reducing overburdened court dockets, and successfully
leveraging the third-party expertise of mediators, arbitrators, and private
judges that might not be found in the current judicial system.25 With all of
these potential benefits to individuals and the judiciary, it seems paradoxical
that consumers are challenging these ADR and ODR clauses, and that courts
are willing to strike them down as unconscionable or as violations of public
policy. 26 These persistent challenges to dispute resolution clauses suggest
that the general public does not perceive the benefits of ADR and ODR and
may view ADR or ODR as legal roadblocks thwarting the fair, convenient,
and inexpensive resolution of online disputes. 27 The rising discord in the
state courts over ADR and ODR provisions in clickwrap agreements suggests
that the time has come to reassess issues of fundamental fairness and good
public policy in crafting these clauses for online transactions.
To date, most e-businesses have focused primarily on exhaustive
warnings about and disclosures of dispute resolution clauses. 28 These
detailed provisions are primarily intended to meet the requirements of
contract mutual assent29 with little regard as to (1) whether consumers have
any understanding what these clauses mean to them, 30 (2) the relative fit
supra note 22, at 24-31; COLIN RULE, ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION FOR BUsINESS: B2B,
ECOMMERCE, CONSUMER, EMPLOYMENT, INSURANCE, AND OTHER COMMERCIAL
CONFLICTS 61-80 (Jossey-Bass 2002).
25 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
26 See supra notes 6, 18 and accompanying text; infra notes 84-117, 126-208 and
accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 147, 151 and accompanying text. Despite the heated debate over
mandatory arbitration clauses in clickwrap agreements, a 2005 study of online software
licenses found that only about six percent of these agreements required the use of
arbitration. Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 15, at 50.
28 See infra notes 133-41, 214-23 and accompanying text.
29 See Ponte, supra note 19, at 452-57; Ben-Shahar, supra note 4, at 4; supra note 4
and accompanying text. Professor Omri Ben-Shahar indicated that mutual assent has been
turned on its head because "[pleople manifest assent, not by affirmative informed
acceptance of terms, but by deciding to forego the opportunity to read." Ben-Shahar,
supra note 4, at 4.
30 See Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Crowd-Consumers and the
Common Law Tradition, 31 U. Prr. L. REv. 349, 355 (1970); Richard E. Speidel,
Unconscionability, Assent and Consumer Protection, 31 U. PITT. L. REv. 359, 364, 375
(1970); Ben-Shahar, supra note 4, at 2. Professor Ben-Shahar remarks that:
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between the dispute resolution method and the typical disputes in that online
marketplace, 31 or (3) the substantive concerns about the fundamental fairness
of the selected dispute resolution processes. 32 More importantly, these
extensive clauses are at odds with typical web design principles that prompt
consumers to scan and browse web content; not read these online materials in
a detailed manner.33 In the absence of legally mandated standards for dispute
resolution clauses, there has seemingly been a race to the bottom in the
quality of dispute resolution clauses, 34 which may explain the increasing
[c]ontract law is obsessively engaged with this problem of enhanced
opportunity to read, in the name of principles of autonomy and individual power, but
ironically-so I claimed in this Essay-the solutions currently offered do nothing to
promote competition and robust assent. Opportunity to read fine print is sterile
ammunition against the power and sophistication of contract drafters.
Id. at 34.
31 See infra notes 146-48, 158-65 and accompanying text.
32 Ponte, supra note 19, at 465-66.
33 Tasker & Pakcyk, supra note 4, at 105-06. The authors contend that courts often
fail to recognize important distinctions between online clickwrap agreements and
standard paper contracts based on "technical nuances" in web design. Id. at 105-06, 109.
The authors assert that current presentations of terms of use fail to take into account the
conventions of website design and normal user browsing habits. Id. at 105-06. The
authors state that:
[w]eb site designers are taught to create a page for visitors to scan and get the
gist of the content; users are not expected to read every word from top to bottom of a
web page. Further, Internet developers have been catering to visitors who expect
"eye-popping animations" and "mind-blowing interactivity." Web pages today can
have "nifty graphics and snazzy sounds." They can incorporate "techniques used by
artists in traditional animation studios." One common effect type is to have
animations, images, or text changing upon the cursor rolling over a portion of a
page. Such effects might draw a reader's attention away from contract terms.
Imagine the difficulty of trying to concentrate on noticing or reading a contract
while rapidly moving animation dances before one's eyes, or while a sound effect or
a catchy tune are playing.
Indeed, a web page may be overloaded with such varied elements. In such
instances, terms may be difficult to find among the clutter. Too many images on a
web page can be distracting. One can easily envision a web site containing fast-
moving animation that invites computer users to navigate into another topical area,
thereby causing them to be distracted away from contractual provisions.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See Hillman, supra note 4, at 844.
34 See infra notes 73-141 and accompanying text.
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number of unconscionability and public policy challenges to clickwrap
dispute resolution clauses. 35
In the context of unconscionability, contracts scholar Professor Arthur
Allen Leff argued that contracts of adhesion should not be viewed as
contracts at all, but metaphorically as "products," since there is no real
negotiation between the parties as found in traditional contracts. 36 Professor
Leff tried to reorient contracts thinkers in an era of rapid contract
standardization to clearly distinguish adhesion contracts from negotiated
ones. 37 He contended that adhesive consumer clauses should be ruled
unconscionable if they "fall below a certain minimum quality."'38 Borrowing
from this notion in the context of dispute resolution clauses, minimum
quality expectations are needed to restore a reasonable level of consumer
confidence in and respect for clickwrap dispute resolution clauses. 39 Like
other online products or services, adhesive dispute resolution terms should
have adequate consumer labeling that considers the fast-paced nature of
users' online browsing habits as well as a simple rating system to help online
consumers assess the basic quality of these clauses.40
This article considers major case law invalidating dispute resolution
clauses in online agreements under traditional contract principles of
35 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
36 Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REv. 131, 146-47 (1970);
Leff, supra note 30, at 352 n.18. See Ben-Shahar, supra note 4, at 6. See generally
Margaret Jane Radin, Online Standardization and the Integration of Text and Machine,
70 FORDHAM L. REv. 1125, 1144-46 (2002) (stating that the growing standardization of
online contracts is creating a "dissolution of the distinction between text and technology"
in e-commerce).
37 See Leff, supra note 36, at 131. In considering adhesion contracts as things,
Professor Leff recognized that the analogy was not a perfect fit. Id at 157. He concluded
that:
[a] consumer contract is not a thing, at least not the way cars, cows and couches
are things,... Thus the real hope of an exercise like this is necessarily more modest
than any total sensory transformation. It can aspire at most temporarily to smash the
semantic box in which our current thinking is locked. The next step, and the harder
one, is crafting a better cabinet out of materials really available in a real world.
Id. 38 Leff, supra note 30, at 352 n.18.
39 See id.; Ben-Shahar, supra note 4, at 6; infra Part III, and accompanying
footnotes.
40 See infra Part IV and accompanying footnotes.
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unconscionability and public policy. 41 Secondly, this article reviews the key
quality issues that led state courts to strike down adhesive dispute resolution
clauses. 42 In light of this case law, this article proposes minimum quality
standards for dispute resolution clauses in clickwrap agreements to help
restore confidence in and reduce challenges to such clauses in online
transactions. 43 In addition, this article recommends simplified disclosure
approaches better suited to typical user browsing habits, including the
development of straightforward disclosure tables and a rating system to
provide fast and ready identification of online merchants offering quality
dispute resolution clauses in clickwrap agreements.44 This blend of minimum
quality standards with simplified online disclosures will provide more
accessible information to online consumers 45 as well as help to motivate
greater competition between online sellers over the provision of highly-rated
conflict resolution methods, thereby elevating the overall quality of dispute
resolution clauses in the online world.46
II. OVERVIEW OF UNCONSCIONABILITY
A. Key Principles
The concept of unconscionability 47 dates back to Roman times 48 and
examines whether or not there is gross inequality, oppression, or unfair
41 See infra Part II.A and accompanying footnotes; infra notes 118-25, 171-78 and
accompanying text.
42 See infra notes 47-65, 171-78 and accompanying text.
43 See infra Part III and accompanying footnotes.
44 See infra Part IV and accompanying footnotes. See generally Ben-Shahar, supra
note 4, at 28-33 (calling for rating and labeling regimes for all terms in standard form
contracts, but suggesting that in e-commerce transactions, the absence of rating systems
suggests that there may be little interest in or demand for such ratings).
45 See infra Parts III, IV and accompanying footnotes.
46 See Hillman, supra note 4, at 845-46; infra notes 289-90 and accompanying text.
47 In determining unconscionability, the famous quote is that an unconscionable
agreement is "such as no man in his senses and not under delusion would make on the
one hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept on the other." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. b (1981) (citing Hume v. United States, 132 U.S.
406 (1889)). The notion of unconscionability is contained in both the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts and the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.). The relevant
Restatement provision states that:
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surprise in a contractual bargain. 49 Drawn from equitable principles 50 and
issues of good faith and fair dealing in contracts, 51 unconscionability is a
question of law for the courts to decide. 52 The courts, in exercising their
[i]f a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is made a
court may refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the remainder of the
contract without the unconscionable term, or may so limit the application of any
unconscionable term as to avoid any unconscionable result.
Id. at § 208.
The U.C.C. contains the following language on unconscionability:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any term of the
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made, the court may
refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract
without the unconscionable term, or it may so limit the application of any
unconscionable term as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) If it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any term
thereof may be unconscionable, the parties shall be afforded a reasonable
opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose, and effect
to aid the court in making the determination.
U.C.C. § 2-302 (2000). See Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The
Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 485, 487-88, 558-89 (1967) (a landmark
article criticizing the amorphous nature of unconscionability under the Code and the
failure to clearly provide an explicit procedural-substantive dichotomy); see also
DiMatteo & Rich, supra note 12, at 1080-88 (providing an interesting overview of
the scholarly debate over the meaning and application of unconscionability under the
U.C.C.).
48 CHARLES L. KNAPP, NATHAN M. CRYSTAL & HARRY G. PRINCE, PROBLEMS IN
CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 584 (Wolters Kluwer 2007) (1976). In land
transactions, ancient Roman law permitted nullification if one party received more than a
two-to-one value in the transaction. Id.
49 U.C.C. § 2-302 n.1 (2000); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. b
(1981); KNAPP ET AL., supra note 48, at 584-85; PERILLO, supra note 5, at 332, 338; Leff,
supra note 47, at 530. In certain European nations, national laws regulate "unfair" terms
in consumer contracts of adhesion with "a much lower threshold for intervention by
courts and regulators than the concept of unconscionability under U.S. Contract Law, or
federal and state regulation of unfair and deceptive trade practices." Winn & Bix, supra
note 5, at 186.
50 KNAPP ET AL., supra note 48, at 584-85; PERILLO, supra note 5, at 332-33; Leff,
supra note 47, at 528-29.
51 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. a (1981); PERILLO, supra note
5, at 340. See DiMatteo & Rich, supra note 12, at 1081.
52 U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (2000); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208
cmts. b & f (1981); Leff, supra note 47, at 510. See Leff, supra note 30, at 356-58
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policing efforts, are not intended to disrupt the parties' allocation of risks
under the contract 53-although they eventually do just that if an agreement is
found unconscionable. 54 Courts have long recognized unconscionability as a
basis for refusing to enforce an entire agreement or the offending clauses, or
limiting the application of unconscionable provisions within an agreement. 55
There are two components of the concept: procedural unconscionability and
substantive unconscionability. 56 Some courts require a showing of both
forms of unconscionability to invalidate an unconscionable clause 57 while
others find that a showing of either substantive or procedural
unconscionability alone is sufficient.58 Unequal or superior bargaining power
(criticizing the use of courts, rather than legislation, to police unconscionable contracts);
Speidel, supra note 30, at 364-65 (questioning the "expenditure of judicial energy" on
unconscionability and suggesting that consumer protection laws put "more direct pressure
on the professional to improve the quality of contract terms" and expecting business to
justify the reasonableness of their conduct toward consumers). But see John E. Murray,
Jr., Unconscionability: Unconscionability, 31 U. PIrT. L. REv. 1, 40-43, 80 (1969)
(arguing for respecting the value of allowing judicial determinations to develop the
proper contours of U.C.C. provision on unconscionability).
53 The official comment to this U.C.C. section states that the concept of
unconscionability "is one of prevention of oppression and unfair surprise and not of
disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power." U.C.C. § 2-302
cmt. 1 (2000). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. b (1981).
54 Murray, supra note 52, at 40-41. Professor John E. Murray asserted that if there is
unfair surprise or undue hardship, "the allocation of the risks as evidenced by the writing
must be disturbed." Id. at 41.
55 U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (2000); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981).
See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
56 PERILLO, supra note 5, at 332, 338; Leff, supra note 47, at 487. Professor Leff
first asserted this dichotomy, referring to "bargaining naughtiness as 'procedural
unconscionability,' and to evils in the resulting contract as 'substantive
unconscionability."' Id. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture, 350 F.2d 445 (D.C.
Cir. 1965) (a seminal case on procedural and substantive unconscionability in a consumer
contract of adhesion in a rent-to-own goods transaction).
57 For example, California state courts require a showing of both procedural and
substantive unconscionability, while New York state courts permit substantive
unconscionability alone to serve as a basis for finding a contract unconscionable.
PERILLO, supra note 5, at 282 n.14.
58 In Washington and Illinois state courts, either procedural or substantive
unconscionability can provide an independent basis for an unconscionability challenge.
Id. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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may be a part of the unconscionability analysis, but that factor by itself will
not result in an agreement being found unconscionable. 59
The idea of unconscionability is also recognized throughout the EU
where an emphasis is placed on consumer protection from "unfair" terms. 60
Since contracts of adhesion do not allow for any individual negotiation, the
EU approach recognizes market imperfections inherent in these standard
form agreements and guards against the potential for harsh, one-sided terms
in contracts of adhesion.61 The EU regulatory stance tries to promote good
59 U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (2000); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt.
c (1981). See PERILLO, supra note 5, at 340; Murray, supra note 52, at 41.
60 See Council Directive 93/13, Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, 1993 O.J. (L
95) 29-34 (EU), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?
uri=CELEX: 1993L0013:EN:HTML [hereinafter Unfair Contracts Directive]. Article 3 of
the Unfair Contracts Directive states that:
1. A contractual term which has not been individually negotiated shall be
regarded as unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant
imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the
detriment of the consumer.
2. A term shall always be regarded as not individually negotiated where it has
been drafted in advance and the consumer has therefore not been able to influence
the substance of the term, particularly in the context of a pre-formulated standard
contract.
The fact that certain aspects of a term or one specific term have been
individually negotiated shall not exclude the application of this Article to the rest of
a contract if an overall assessment of the contract indicates that it is nevertheless a
pre-formulated standard contract.
Where any seller or supplier claims that a standard term has been individually
negotiated, the burden of proof in this respect shall be incumbent on him.
3. The Annex shall contain an indicative and non-exhaustive list of the terms
which may be regarded as unfair.
Id. art. 3. See Council Directive 97/7, Protection of Consumers in Respect of Distance
Contracts, 1997 O.J. (L 144) 19-28 (EU), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31997L0007:EN:HTML
[hereinafter Distance Contracts Directive] (spelling out consumer protections in online
consumer-merchant transactions, including a requirement that consumers may not waive
protections of their national laws or courts in online agreements); Distance Selling
Directive, supra note 16 (mandating that national consumer protection laws apply equally
to online consumer transactions and referencing the Distance Contracts Directive for
support).
61 Winn & Bix, supra note 5, at 183-84. See supra notes 20, 30, 36 and
accompanying text; infra note 138 and accompanying text.
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faith and fair dealing in consumer transactions through detailed consumer
protection laws and policies, and by mandating transparency throughout the
consumer contracting process 62 for both online and brick-and-mortar
merchants. 63 Contracts of adhesion must be written in easy to understand
language, with any ambiguities interpreted in favor of the consumer.6a These
types of contracts must fully disclose all contract terms before an agreement
is entered into, including any terms contained in fine print or subsequently
delivered to the consumer with the purchased items.65
In the EU, consumer contracts of adhesion that contain boilerplate forum
selection 66 and pre-dispute arbitration clauses67 are automatically viewed as
62 John R. Aguilar, Over the Rainbow: European and American Consumer
Protection Policy and Remedy Conflicts on the Internet and a Possible Solution, 4 INT'L
J. CoMm. L. & POL'Y 1, 17-19 (1999); Ponte, supra note 19, at 456-57; Winn & Bix,
supra note 5, at 185. As to the EU's transparency requirements, Mr. Aguilar has indicated
that:
[t]he EU requires businesses to provide a high level of product and service
information, by basing many decisions upon what the consumer expected and
received, and addresses "fine print" or "surprise ... terms," by requiring contractual
"transparency." EU consumer policy assumes that the consumer has difficulty
understanding contract terms and thus protects consumers from terms that even US
lawyers recognize as a "waste[s] of time" to read or tactically placed to conceal their
legal effect. Further, EU consumer policy assumes that while businesses may retain
or use in-house attorneys, institute debt collection procedures or file bad credit
reports, a consumer may not. Working to increase e-consumer confidence with these
guarantees, EU consumer protection has become almost a fundamental right that has
lessened, if not eliminated, caveat emptor.
Aguilar, supra note 62, at 20-21 (alteration in original) (emphasis and footnotes omitted).
63 Ponte, supra note 19, at 457; Winn & Bix, supra note 5, at 185.
64 Unfair Contracts Directive, supra note 60, art. 5. See Winn & Bix, supra note 5,
at 187-88.
65 Ponte, supra note 19, at 457; Winn & Bix, supra note 5, at 185.
66 Distance Contracts Directive, supra note 60, art. 12. Under Article 12 of that
directive:
1. The consumer may not waive the rights conferred on him by the
transposition of this Directive into national law.
2. Member States shall take the measures needed to ensure that the consumer
does not lose the protection granted by this Directive by virtue of the choice of the
law of a non-member country as the law applicable to the contract if the latter has
close connection with the territory of one or more Member States.
Id.
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unfair and illegal terms under various contract and e-commerce directives.68
In the EU, the courts typically sever these unfair terms from the remaining
valid terms of the consumer-merchant contractual relationship.69 Many other
developed economies, such as Canada, Japan, and Australia, follow the EU
approach 70 rather than the U.S. approach, which emphasizes contract
efficiency and places the onus on consumers to read and understand form
contracts filled with legalese. 71 While the EU focuses on merchant
compliance with regulatory prescriptions, the U.S. approach primarily relies
on courts to make case-by-case determinations on issues of procedural and
substantive unconscionability. 72
B. Procedural Unconscionability
In the U.S., procedural unconscionability considers the integrity of the
agreement by focusing on unfair surprise and the absence of meaningful
choice as a procedural flaw in the negotiation or contract formation stage.73
Examples of procedural unconscionability often involve unsophisticated
67 The Annex to Article 3(3) of the Unfair Contracts Directive lists a number of
unfair terms, including, but not limited to:
q) excluding or hindering the consumer's right to take legal action or exercise
any other legal remedy, particularly by requiring the consumer to take disputes
exclusively to arbitration not covered by legal provisions, unduly restricting the
evidence available to him or imposing on him a burden of proof which, according to
the applicable law, should lie with another party to the contract.
Unfair Contracts Directive, supra note 60, annex (1)(q). See Ponte, supra note 19, at
461-62; Tapio Puurunen, The Legislative Jurisdiction of States over Transactions in
International Electronic Commerce, 18 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 689, 694-
95 (2000).
68 Ponte, supra note 19, at 461-62; Puurunen, supra note 67, at 694-95; Winn &
Bix, supra note 5, at 186-90.
69 Unfair Contracts Directive, supra note 60, art. (3)(1). See supra note 51 and
accompanying text.
70 Winn & Bix, supra note 5, at 183-84. Under certain national laws, such as in
Finland, England, Wales, and Northern Ireland, pre-dispute ADR clauses are invalid in
consumer contracts and the laws require that any agreement to use ADR must occur after
the conflict has arisen. Ponte, supra note 19, at 461-62.
71 Ponte, supra note 19, at 456; Winn & Bix, supra note 5, at 183-84.
72 See infra notes 73-83, 118-25, 228 and accompanying text.
13 U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (2000); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208
cmts. c & d (1981); Leff, supra note 47, at 489. See PERILLO, supra note 5, at 340.
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consumers who have had little opportunity to undertake a meaningful review
of the contract terms, 74 and therefore are surprised by a lack of clear and
conspicuous contract terms. 75 Other factors that may be assessed in
determining procedural unconscionability include: key clauses buried in fine
print, the use of extensive legalese that is difficult for the ordinary person to
understand,76 the failure to clearly identify how the consumer may reject the
terms of an online agreement, and the existence of an arbitration clause. 77
Concerns about unfair surprise can be further exacerbated by website design,
including the placement and color of hyperlinks to the terms of the
agreement,78 the use of indistinguishable blocks of text,79 the font size of text
in the agreement, 80 temporary and disappearing pop-up windows, 81 and other
unconventional website designs. 82 Furthermore, by overloading web pages
with dynamic graphics or entertaining animation, online businesses may
easily divert consumer attention away from contractual terms and
conditions. 83
74 Kunz et al., supra note 10, at 295-97. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
75 PERILLO, supra note 5, at 338-39; Kunz, et al., supra note 10, at 291-94; Tasker
& Pakcyk, supra note 4, at 90-94. See DiMatteo & Rich, supra note 12, at 1111-12
(presenting the authors' empirical research which indicates that clear and conspicuous
notice of contract terms is the key "consent-enhancing" factor in a court's determination
whether or not an agreement is procedurally unconscionable). Professor Leff's assertion
is that a merchant's "super-disclosure" followed by a consumer's "super-assent" might
allow an otherwise unconscionable contract term to be upheld in certain instances. Leff,
supra note 30, at 349-50. See supra note 6 and accompanying text; infra notes 227-28,
251-53 and accompanying text (discussing superdisclosure).
76 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. d (1981); PERILLO, supra note
5, at 339.
77 DeFontes v. Dell, Inc., 984 A.2d 1061, 1072-73 (R.I. 2009) (determining that
agreement language that return of products constituted a rejection of clickwrap and
shrinkwrap agreements was too ambiguous).
78 Kunz et al., supra note 10, at 305; Tasker & Pakcyk, supra note 4, at 95-96, 106-
07.
79 Juliet M. Moringiello & William L. Reynolds, Survey of the Law of Cyberspace:
Electronic Contracting Cases 2007-2008, 64 Bus. LAW. 199, 214-15 (2008).
80 Tasker & Pakcyk, supra note 4, at 132.
81 Id. at 98-99.
82 Tasker & Pakcyk, supra note 4, at 95-99. See Moringiello & Reynolds, supra
note 79, at 214-15.
83 Tasker & Pakcyk, supra note 4, at 105-07.
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In Trujillo v. Apple Computer, Inc.,84 the court dealt with a binding
arbitration clause in an iPhone activation agreement that forbade class
arbitrations. 85 In reviewing the case facts, the court found that the consumer,
who purchased the iPhone as a gift for his spouse, did not have access to a
hard copy of the agreement or notice of access to online terms on the iPhone
website at the time of purchase, which turned out to be an out-of-date
version.8 6 The court determined that the Apple store had not put up any signs
or placards advising consumers of the terms' availability online at time of
purchase. 87 Also, the court was unwilling to find that consumers should have
figured out that the terms were available online. 88 Subsequently, at time of
phone activation, the consumer must agree to the terms of service to activate
the phone. Yet, the court criticized the small window through which
consumers could view the very lengthy agreement89 and castigated Apple for
not providing these contract terms at the time of consumer purchase.90 The
84 Trujillo v. Apple Computer, Inc., 578 F. Supp. 2d 979 (N.D. I11. 2008).
85 Id. at 980-81, 986. Trujillo sued AT&T Mobility LLC (ATTM) and Apple
Computer, Inc. (Apple) for misleading consumers about the life of the iPhone battery and
the costs to replace it. Id. at 980-81. The clause stated that: "'we each agree to resolve
those disputes through binding arbitration or small claims court instead of in courts of
general jurisdiction' and that '[a]ny arbitration under this Agreement will take place on
an individual basis; class arbitrations and class actions are not permitted."' Id. at 986
(alteration in original) (citation omitted).
86 Id. at 994-95.
87 Id. at 989-90.
88 Id. The court indicated that:
[o]ne might suggest that given the ubiquity of computers and access to the
Internet, someone in Trujillo's position could have figured out on his own where to
look online and what to look for. Putting aside the sufficiency of that proposition
from a legal standpoint to establish access to ATTM's service terms, it utterly fails
as a matter of evidence. Specifically, ATTM has offered no evidence that assists in
bridging the gap from the theoretical availability of the obsolete version of the terms
of service online (along with millions of other websites and documents) to a finding
that Trujillo actually had access to it: it has offered no evidence that he was aware of
the online version, that he was advised of it, or that, as a reasonable consumer, he
should have known of it.
Id.
89 Id. at 986.
90 Trujillo v. Apple Computer, Inc., 578 F. Supp. 2d 979, 994-95 (N.D. Ill. 2008).
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court found the agreement to be procedurally unconscionable in light of these
circumstances. 91
In Comb v. PayPal, Inc.,92 the court considered an arbitration clause 93 in
the online terms of PayPal's electronic payment service for both consumer
and business users in a class action lawsuit. 94 The users claimed that PayPal
froze accounts to investigate fraud claims depriving users of their funds, even
funds not in dispute, in violation of state and federal laws. 95 In order to use
PayPal's services, customers must agree to a very long clickwrap agreement
before their application can be processed. 96 Online customers are warned that
by clicking on "I Agree," that they are entering into a contract and are
advised to review PayPal's terms carefully before choosing to proceed. 97
Under California law, a contract of adhesion is procedurally unconscionable
if it is drafted by the party with superior bargaining power and provides no
opportunity for other parties to negotiate its terms, allowing them only the
ability to accept or reject the entire agreement. 98
PayPal did not deny that a contract of adhesion was involved, but
indicated that it was not procedurally unconscionable since it did not deal
91 Id. at 990. The Trujillo court decided that since the contract was procedurally
unconscionable, the court did not need to consider substantive unconscionability under
Illinois law. Id.
92 Comb v. PayPal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
93 The PayPal arbitration clause at that time stated the following:
Arbitration. Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this
Agreement or the provision of Services shall be settled by binding arbitration in
accordance with the commercial arbitration rules of the American Arbitration
Association. Any such controversy or claim shall be arbitrated on an individual
basis, and shall not be consolidated in any arbitration with any claim or controversy
of any other party. The arbitration shall be conducted in Santa Clara County,
California, and judgment on the arbitration award may be entered in any court
having jurisdiction thereof. Either you or PayPal may seek any interim or
preliminary relief from a court of competent jurisdiction in Santa Clara County,
California necessary to protect the rights or property of you or PayPal, Inc. (or its
agents, suppliers, and subcontractors) pending the completion of arbitration.
Id. at 1170 (emphasis omitted).
94 1d. at 1166.
95 Id. at 1166-67.
96 Id. at 1169. The court noted that the terms of use were "lengthy," composed "of
twenty-five printed pages and eleven sections, each containing a number of
subparagraphs enumerating the parties' respective obligations and duties." Id.
97 Id.
98 Comb v. PayPal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1172-73 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
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with necessaries, such as food or clothing,99 and because users could have
chosen other online electronic disbursement services if they did not wish to
agree to PayPal's terms of use. 100 Citing Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v.
Superior Court of Alameda County,101 a case involving the validity of an
arbitration clause in a stock brokerage agreement, PayPal argued "that the
availability of alternative sources is enough to defeat a showing of procedural
unconscionability." 102 The PayPal court rejected this argument, first
distinguishing the savvy investors in Dean Witter from the unsophisticated
PayPal customers whose small-dollar transactions averaged about $55.00. l 3
The court also noted that the investors in Dean Witter had other institutional
brokerage options without arbitration provisions, but a factual dispute existed
as to whether PayPal's competitors had agreements without mandatory
arbitration clauses. 104 In addition, the court stated that the Dean Witter court
had clearly stated that "any showing of competition in the marketplace as to
the desired goods and services" alone was not sufficient to overcome a claim
of procedural unconscionability. 105 The court concluded that PayPal's
dispute resolution terms were procedurally unconscionable. 106
In another California case, Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc.,107 the court
relied heavily on Comb, but expanded its discussion on procedural
unconscionability in a contract of adhesion in the virtual world of Second
Life operated by Linden Research, Inc. (Linden). 10 8 The conflict between the
parties involved a $300 virtual property dispute in Second Life in which
Linden froze Bragg's account, preventing his access to his virtual property
and funds in the account. 109 The site's terms of use contained a mandatory
arbitration clause under the heading "GENERAL PROVISIONS," requiring
an arbitration held in San Francisco, California, applying the rules of the
9 9 Id. at 1172.
100 ld. at 1172-73.
101 Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 211 Cal. App.
3d 758, 769 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
102 Comb, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1172.
103 Id. at 1173-74.
104 Comb v. PayPal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1173-74 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
105 Id. at 1173.
106 Id.
107 Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
108 Id. at 603-04.
109 Id. at 597.
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International Chamber of Commerce (ICC).°10 Although the party had access
to the agreement in advance, the court determined that the mandatory
arbitration clause in that online agreement was procedurally unconscionable,
even though the consumer was an experienced attorney. " '
Similar to Comb, the court determined that a contract of adhesion is
automatically procedurally unconscionable since the consumer, as the party
with less bargaining power, is offered the agreement on a "take it or leave it"
basis and is not permitted any meaningful opportunity for negotiation of the
contract terms. 112 The court noted that Bragg was an attorney, but because of
the agreement's adhesive nature, Bragg was unable to apply his legal
experience and negotiating skills to the terms of use. 113 Consumers also did
not have reasonable market alternatives to consider at that time because only
Second Life offered the unique opportunity to own their virtual property. 14
The Bragg court also recognized that there was unfair surprise because
the adhesive provision was buried in fine print in a long paragraph under the
"benign heading 'GENERAL PROVISIONS."' 115 Furthermore, the clause
did not contain or provide a hyperlink to information on the costs or rules of
the ICC proceedings to enable consumers to evaluate the process and costs of
arbitration before agreeing to the site's terms of use. 116 The court found that
this presentation of the terms of use further supported its finding of
procedural unconscionability. 117
110 Id. at 603-04. The clause stated that:
Any dispute or claim arising out of or in connection with this Agreement or the
performance, breach or termination thereof, shall be finally settled by binding
arbitration in San Francisco, California under the Rules of Arbitration of the
International Chamber of Commerce by three arbitrators appointed in accordance
with said rules .... Notwithstanding the foregoing, either party may apply to any
court of competent jurisdiction for injunctive relief or enforcement of this arbitration
provision without breach of this arbitration provision.
Id. at 604.
111 Id. at 606.
'
12 Id.
113 Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
1 14 Id. See generally BENJAMIN TYSON DURANSKE, VIRTUAL LAW: NAVIGATING THE
LEGAL LANDSCAPE OF VIRTUAL WORLDS 86-96 (2008) (discussing the main arguments
for and against the recognition of virtual property).
115 Bragg, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 606-07.
116Id. at 607. See infra notes 149-52, 158-65 and accompanying text.
117 Bragg, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 607.
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C. Substantive Unconscionability
Courts examine disputed contract terms to determine if they are
oppressively harsh or one-sided, and therefore substantively
unconscionable.118 This situation occurs most often when there is unequal
bargaining power between the contracting parties. 119 Substantive
unconscionability is commonly found when contract terms involve exorbitant
prices or exculpatory clauses favoring the drafter of the agreement, such as
warranty disclaimers, damage limitations, or other clauses providing
remedial advantages. 120 Parties have successfully claimed substantive
unconscionability in online agreement arbitration clauses based on the high
costs of the arbitration process in relation to the amount in dispute, 121 the
lack of mutuality in conflict resolution options, 122 the inconvenience of the
venue of the mandated forum, 123 the repeat player bias inherent in
confidential arbitration proceedings, 124 and the inability of the e-business to
118 PERILLO, supra note 5, at 332, 338; Leff, supra note 47, at 491,497-98.
119 PERILLO, supra note 5, at 338-39; Leff, supra note 47, at 552-53. See supra note
59 and accompanying text.
120 PERILLO, supra note 5, at 339-40. See DiMatteo & Rich, supra note 12, at 1107
(presenting the authors' empirical study that finds that successful unconscionability
claims involved unsophisticated consumers who entered into agreements containing one-
sided clauses that were often excessive in price or contained exculpatory clauses favoring
merchants); see also Doe v. SexSearch.com, 551 F.3d 412 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008)
(determining that a user of an online adult dating service who faced criminal charges for
unlawful sexual conduct with a minor failed to support claim of unconscionability under
Ohio law, where the contract contained clauses limiting damage amounts, and allowed
unilateral contract cancellation, and asserting unspecified clauses as substantially one-
sided).
121 Huff v. Liberty League Int'l, No. EDCV 08-1010-VAP (SSx), 2009 WL
1033788, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 2009) (finding unconscionable attorney fees and costs
contained in online home study and sales product agreement unenforceable and severable
from the remaining provisions of a valid arbitration clause); Bragg v. Linden Research,
Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 608-10 (E.D. Pa. 2007); Comb v. PayPal, Inc., 218 F. Supp.
2d 1165, 1176-77 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (finding that an online payment service's adhesive
agreement that contained prohibitive arbitration fees was unconscionable under
California law). Contra Hubbert v. Dell Corp., 835 N.E.2d 113, 125-26 (Ill. App. Ct.
2005), appeal denied, 844 N.E.2d 965 (Ill. 2006) (finding that a conspicuous arbitration
clause giving only discretionary authority to the arbitrator to award costs and attorneys'
fees was not unconscionable in an online computer purchase).
122 Bragg, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 607-08; Comb, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1173-74.
123 See infra notes 142-48 and accompanying text.
124 Bragg, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 610; Comb, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1173-74.
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show any commercial need or business reality to justify the one-sided
terms. 125
Both Comb and Bragg offer comprehensive reviews of substantive
unconscionability to strike down their respective arbitration clauses. 126 In
both cases, part of the court's rationale for finding substantive
unconscionabilty was based on the court's determination that the dispute
resolution terms lacked mutuality. 127 The courts stated that arbitration
clauses can be unconscionable if the party with superior power reserves a
variety of dispute resolution options for themselves while limiting the less
powerful party to arbitration. 128 Both courts noted that a stronger party might
be able to justify the lack of mutuality by providing evidence that there is "a
legitimate commercial need" for restricting dispute resolution options under
the clause. 129
Under Comb, the court found that the terms of use provided a range of
dispute options for PayPal to exercise "at its sole discretion," including
closing accounts, restricting access to accounts, withholding user funds,
investigating users' financial transactions, and retaining ownership of user
funds.13 0 PayPal also reserved the right to unilaterally modify the terms of
use by posting the new or amended terms on its website without notice unless
otherwise required by law. 131 Users were primarily limited to using
125 Bragg, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 607-08; Comb, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1174-75. Some
scholars have indicated that merchants may be effectively constrained from using overly
harsh terms in contracts of adhesion due to concerns about their goodwill and reputation
amongst consumers in the marketplace. Douglas G. Baird, The Boilerplate Puzzle, in
BOILERPLATE: THE FOUNDATION OF MARKET CONTRACTS 131, 134 (Omri Ben-Shahar
ed., 2007); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in
Competitive Consumer Markets, in BOILERPLATE: THE FOUNDATION OF MARKET
CONTRACTS 3, 3 (Omri Ben-Shahar ed., 2007).
126 See infra notes 130-39 and accompanying text.
127 See infra notes 130-39 and accompanying text.
128 Comb v. PayPal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1173 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
129 Id. at 1174.
130 Id. at 1173-74.
131 Id. at 1174. So far, the issue of posting unilateral changes to agreements on
company websites has produced several cases finding posting these changes without
other reasonable notice does not bind customers. See, e.g., Douglas v. U. S. Dist. Court
for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 495 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1242
(2008) (finding that posting unilateral changes solely on the company's website regarding
telephone services does not give reasonable notice, and users are not bound to the
changed terms); Comb, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1173 (determining that PayPal reserved the
right to post unilateral changes to terms of service on its website as part of finding
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arbitration in their disputes with PayPal, but either party could seek
injunctive relief from the Santa Clara County courts. 132
PayPal argued that the arbitration clause did not lack mutuality because
customers could seek relief in the courts for frozen amounts, while awaiting
the outcome of an arbitration proceeding. 133 However, in Comb, the court
noted that even theoretical access to the courts can still be substantively
unconscionable. 134 The court countered that PayPal could freeze accounts
unilaterally in its own discretion and that:
[w]hile in theory a customer may seek provisional relief in the courts,
including presumably an order to unfreeze an account, the cost of doing so
would be prohibitive in relation to the amounts typically in dispute. For all
practical purposes, a customer may resolve disputes only after PayPal has
had control of the disputed funds for an indefinite period of time. 135
In striking down the arbitration clause, the court indicated that PayPal's
terms were too one-sided and that PayPal failed to establish any legitimate
commercial need for the limited dispute alternatives under its terms of use. 136
Similarly, in Bragg, Linden reserved for itself a variety of options to
resolve its conflicts with users, including the right to suspend or terminate a
user's accounts, to refuse current or future service without notice or liability,
and to retain a user's funds based only upon 'suspicions of fraud' or other
violations of law."' 137 Linden was also permitted to unilaterally amend the
online agreement to change the dispute resolution terms by merely posting
the changes to its website without any further notice to users. 138 As in Comb,
the court concluded that Linden reserved a host of self-help remedies for
PayPal's online terms to be substantively unconscionable); Briceflo v. Sprint Spectrum,
911 So. 2d 176 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (finding that the plaintiff was bound by
changes in the cell phone service agreement when he was notified on an invoice that
amended terms had been posted online and he failed to cancel the revised contract).
132 Comb, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1173. PayPal's terms stated that "[e]ither you or
PayPal may seek any interim or preliminary relief from a court of competent jurisdiction
in Santa Clara County, California necessary to protect the rights or property of you or
PayPal, Inc. (or its agents, suppliers, and subcontractors) pending the completion of
arbitration." Id.
133 Id. at 1174-75.
134 Comb v. PayPal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1174-75 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
135 Id. at 1175.
1361id.
137 Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 608 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
138 Id.
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itself while forcing users to arbitrate their conflicts with Linden. 139 In
addition, the court stated that Linden's power to unilaterally revise the clause
gave Linden the chance to "craft precisely the sort of asymmetrical
arbitration agreement that is prohibited under California law as
unconscionable." 140 The court further determined that Linden failed to
provide evidence of any business realities to justify the one-sided nature of
its dispute resolution clause. 141
Both the Comb and Bragg courts also criticized the online businesses for
limiting the venues for the arbitral forum to locations in California for
customers they knew were strewn across the United States. 142 In Comb, the
terms of use mandated that the arbitration take place in Santa Clara County,
California. 143 PayPal argued that the selected venue was not unconscionable
because forum selection clauses are "prima facie valid" and that such arbitral
forum selection clauses are reasonable and readily upheld by courts. 144 In
139 Id.
140 Id. (citing Net Global Mktg., Inc. v. Dialtone, Inc., 217 Fed. App'x. 598, 602
(Cal. 2007)). See Becher, supra note 4, at 733-34. Professor Shmuel I. Becher defines
asymmetric information as existing in instances in which one party has much better
access to and familiarity with information than another. Id. at 733. In the contracts
context, he notes that the drafter of the form contract is far more informed and familiar
with its terms and conditions while consumers are "imperfectly informed." Id. He adds
that:
[t]he existence of obligational asymmetric information is a serious market
failure that can undermine the efficiency of many consumer transactions. Contracts
will systematically increase welfare if, and only if, contracting parties have the
information necessary for an informed evaluation of all transactional aspects
(including, of course, contract terms). Stated slightly differently, information
inequalities belie the maxim that promisees (i.e., consumers) are the best judges of
their own utility. Where imperfect information exists, the ability of parties to
maximize utility via open market transactions will inevitably decrease.
Id. at 734.
141 Bragg, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 610.
142 See Bragg, 487 F. Supp. 2d 593; Comb v. PayPal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165
(N.D. Cal. 2002).
143 Comb, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1176.
144 Id. at 1176-77. In the 2005 study on End User License Agreements for software,
Professor Florencia Marotta-Wurgler found that most of the studied firms did not forum
shop, but reasonably opted for the location of their headquarters in their choice of forum
clauses. Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 15, at 48, 63. The study found a dearth of
mandatory arbitration clauses that provide consumers with choices in their dispute
resolution measures, including the opportunity for their day in court. Id. at 48, 51. In
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addition, PayPal contended that the parties were willing to litigate in
California, illustrating that the venue was not "burdensome or inconvenient"
for the plaintiffs. 145 The court responded that the forum selection must not be
unreasonable in light of the "place or manner" of the selected arbitral forum
and of "the respective circumstances of the parties."'1 46 The court found that
PayPal served millions of U.S. customers throughout the nation with the
typical transaction not exceeding $55. 147 Under those circumstances, the
court stated that "[1]imiting venue to PayPal's backyard appears to be yet one
more means by which the arbitration clause serves to shield PayPal from
liability instead of providing a neutral forum in which to arbitrate
disputes."148
In Bragg, the court also considered the choice of venue of the ICC in San
Francisco for the arbitration in light of the relative costs of the chosen forum
and the amounts in dispute. 149 The court found that the venue was
unreasonable since Second Life, like PayPal, was intended to reach millions
of customers across the U.S. and the typical transaction through or with
Second Life involved relatively small dollar amounts.150 As in Comb, the
court decried Linden's choice of venue as an effort to "shield [Linden] from
liability instead of providing a neutral forum in which to arbitrate
disputes."151
The Comb court further considered the prohibition of PayPal's clause
that does not allow users to consolidate their claims in arbitration. 152 Looking
to the California appeals decision in Szetela v. Discover Bank,153 the Comb
court raised concerns that consumers would be deterred from bringing an
action because only small amounts of money were in dispute, permitting a
business to cheat millions of consumers without any meaningful opportunity
to seek redress through collective action. 154 The court indicated that the
prevention of consolidated actions alone is not sufficient to invalidate an
addition, the American Arbitration Association was designated as the required third-party
dispute organization in most instances. Id. at 48, 64.
145 Comb, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1177.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Comb v. PayPal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1177 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
149 Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 610 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
150 Id.
151 Id. (alteration in original).
152 Comb, 218 F. Supp. 2dat 1175.
153 Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
154 Comb v. PayPal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1175 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
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arbitration clause under California's consumer protection statutes, but when
coupled with the other one-sided provisions, it permits a finding of
substantive unconscionability. 155 However, in later precedents, California
courts have taken the view that a bar on consolidated consumer claims in an
arbitration proceeding can be invalidated as unconscionable in clickwrap
agreements as a violation of a fundamental state policy. 156
Expanding upon Comb, the Bragg court also delved into the high costs of
resolving consumer disputes before the ICC in relation to the amount of
money in dispute. 157 The parties disputed the relative costs of bringing an
action before an ICC panel of three arbitrators--costs which would be split
between the parties under the terms of use. 158 The plaintiff estimated that it
would cost more than $13,540 to undertake the arbitration process, including
an initiation fee of at least $10,000.159 Alternatively, Linden argued that the
arbitration expenses would likely total $7,500, with an initial fee of
$3,750.160 The court stated that even using Linden's lower estimate of
upfront fees, the shared arbitration expenses were far greater than the costs of
bringing the matter before a state or federal court. 161 Citing Ting v. AT&T, 162
the court held that it is substantively unconscionable if a fee-sharing scenario
in an adhesive arbitration clause imposes greater advance costs on consumers
than those expected in filing traditional court actions. 163 Therefore, the
imbalance in the relative costs of resolving the contested funds, whether in
court or in arbitration, could provide a basis for a claim of substantive
unconscionability.164
155 Id at 1176.
156 See, e.g., Oestreicher v. Alienware Corp., 502 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1067 (N.D. Cal.
2007) (finding that a provision barring class actions in a "take it or leave it" arbitration
clause cannot be enforced in online computer purchases); Brazil v. Dell Inc., No. C-07-
01700 RMW, 2007 WL 2255296 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2007) (determining that Texas law is
not applicable to class action waiver in arbitration clause because it would violate
California public policy and be substantively unconscionable as a "scheme to deliberately
cheat large numbers of consumers" out of small dollar amounts).
157 Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 608-10 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
158 Id. at 608-09.
159 Id. at 608.
160 Id. The court's own estimates of the costs of arbitration ranged from $17,250 to
$27,375, depending upon the percentage of arbitrator fees. Id. at 609.
161 Id. at 609-10.
16 2 Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126,1151 (9th Cir. 2003).
163 Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 609 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
1641Id
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The Bragg court also considered the confidential nature of the arbitral
process before the ICC as supporting a claim of substantive
unconscionability. 165 Once again citing Ting, the court stated that the
confidentiality of the method provides Linden, as the repeat player in the
arbitration, with substantial advantages based upon Linden's accumulated
knowledge of the arbitral procedures and outcomes so as to hone its legal
position to improve its chances for success. 166 However, the users are not
repeat players and will not have the same experiences or advantages with the
process. 167 The court recognized that confidentiality alone does not make an
arbitration clause unconscionable, but when grouped with the other one-sided
aspects of the provision, it resulted in a finding of substantive
unconscionability. 168
D. Public Policy Challenges to Preclusions of Class Action
Arbitrations
Dispute resolution clauses have also been found to be substantively
unconscionable when the terms violate established state public policy. 169
Courts may rule that these contracts are illegal bargains when contract
provisions contravene state constitutional, statutory, or case law. 170 Courts
will refuse to enforce contract provisions in order to protect the integrity of
the court system 171 and to deter such future contract activities. 172 In a number
of dispute resolution cases, online clauses that prevent access to class
actions 173 or class arbitrations in consumer disputes were found to be
165 Id. at 610.
166 Bragg, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 610 (citing Ting).
1671Id.
168 Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 610 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
169 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(1) (1981); PERILLO, supra note 5,
at 730-31.
170 PERILLO, supra note 5, at 730-31. See Genelle I. Belmas & Brian N. Larson,
Clicking Away Your Speech Rights: The Enforceability of Gagwrap Licenses, 12 COMM.
L. & POL'Y 37, 37-40, 52-53 (2007) (criticizing "gagwrap" licenses, which allow online
contracts of adhesion to deprive users of free speech rights).
171 PERILLO, supra note 5, at 730.
172 Id. As one judicial decision eloquently put it, courts will not enforce illegal
bargains so that "no polluted hand shall touch the pure fountains of justice." Id. at 731
(quoting Collins v. Blantern, 2 Wils. K.B. 347, 350, 95 Eng. Rep. 850, 852 (1767)).
173 See, e.g., Doe 1 v. AOL, 552 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding that a Virginia
forum selection clause preventing class actions violates California's public policy
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substantively unconscionable1 74 because they effectively block access to the
meaningful resolution of typically small-dollar online consumer disputes. 175
favoring consumer class actions, and is therefore an unenforceable online agreement);
Fiser v. Dell Computer Corp., 188 P.3d 1215 (N.M. 2008) (determining that Texas law is
not applicable because a ban on class action litigation or arbitration would violate New
Mexico public policy and be substantively unconscionable as to the small dollar amounts
for online consumer claims). Contra Adler v. Dell Inc., No. 08-CV-13170, 2008 WL
5351042 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 18, 2008) (finding an arbitration agreement containing a class
action waiver provision enforceable under Texas law despite a claim that the clause
might discourage consumers from seeking legal redress for small damage amounts in
online computer purchases).
174 See, e.g., Oestreicher v. Alienware Corp., 502 F. Supp. 2d 1061 (N.D. Cal. 2007)
(finding that a provision barring class actions in a "take it or leave it" arbitration clause
cannot be enforced in online computer purchases); Brazil v. Dell Inc., No. C-07-01700
RMW, 2007 WL 2255296 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2007) (determining that Texas law cannot
be used to grant a class action waiver to the arbitration clause because it would violate
California public policy and be substantively unconscionable as a "scheme to deliberately
cheat large numbers of consumers" out of small dollar amounts); Comb v. PayPal, Inc.,
218 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (determining that an online payment service's
adhesive contract containing an arbitration clause that precludes the joinder of arbitration
claims (making an individual customer's participation in arbitration more economical) is
unconscionable under California law). Contra Guadagno v. E*Trade Bank, 592 F. Supp.
2d 1263, 1271 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (finding that an arbitration clause containing a class
action waiver is not unconscionable and not a contract of adhesion because the terms
were "clear and reasonably conspicuous" and the consumer agreed to the terms by
clicking the acknowledgement icon); Adler, 2008 WL 5351042 (determining an
arbitration agreement containing a class action waiver provision is enforceable under
Texas law despite a claim that the clause might discourage consumers from seeking legal
redress for small damage amounts in online computer purchases); In re Jamster Mktg.
Litig., No. 05cv0819 JM(CAB), 2008 WL 4858506 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2008) (finding
that a class action waiver contained in a reasonable and clear arbitration provision is not
unconscionable under applicable Maryland, Mississippi, or Illinois laws, and compelling
arbitration of consumers' claims concerning deceptive business practices in a free
ringtone marketing scheme); Omstead v. Dell Corp., 473 F. Supp. 2d 1018 (N.D. Cal.
2007) (finding that, in online computer purchases, an arbitration clause with a class
action waiver is not substantively unconscionable under Texas law).
175 Typically, e-commerce involves small dollar amount purchases and consumers
located in different states that have divergent consumer protection laws. See supra notes
146-48, 158-65 and accompanying text. The vast majority of online consumer disputes
involve relatively small dollar amounts, typically $300-$3,000. PONTE & CAVENAGH,
supra note 22, at 12. These comparatively small dollar amounts, coupled with time and
travel expenses, make face-to-face judicial or ADR methods unrealistic for many online
consumers. Id.
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If such clauses contravene an established state law or policy, the clauses may
be found substantively unconscionable, and therefore unenforceable.176
After Comb, the California courts have applied the three-prong analysis
from Discover Bank v. Superior Court of Los Angeles. 177 The court in
Discover Bank held that an arbitration clause precluding collective action in
credit card holder disputes was a violation of public policy.17s Applying the
three-prong test, the Discover Bank court found that a class action waiver
violates public policy, and is therefore unconscionable if: (1) the arbitration
clause is contained in a contract of adhesion, (2) the typical arbitral dispute
involves small dollar amounts, and (3) the party with superior bargaining
power sought to "deliberately cheat large numbers of customers out of
individually small sums of money."' 179
Subsequently, the court in Oestreicher v. Alienware Corp.180 held a
mandatory arbitration clause' 8 ' in a clickwrap agreement for the purchase of
a laptop computer was a violation of public policy and thereby
unconscionable.1 82 Under the terms of use, the governing law was that of the
176 See infra notes 179-208 and accompanying text.
177 Discover Bank v. Sup. Ct. of Los Angeles, 36 Cal. 4th 148, 152 (Cal. 2005).
178 Id. at 155. See Klussman v. Cross Country Bank, 134 Cal. App. 4th 1283 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2005) (finding that a waiver of the right to bring classwide arbitration in
consumer cardholder agreements is unconscionable under California law and is not
severable from the arbitration clause).
179 Discover Bank, 36 Cal. 4th at 162-63.
180 Oestreicher v. Alienware Corp., 502 F. Supp. 2d 1061 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
181 Id. at 1063. The Alienware arbitration clause indicated that any dispute relating
to a computer purchase:
SHALL BE RESOLVED EXCLUSIVELY AND FINALLY BY BINDING
ARBITRATION ADMINISTERED BY THE NATIONAL ARBITRATION
FORUM .... YOU UNDERSTAND THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF THIS
PROVISION, YOU WOULD HAVE HAD A RIGHT TO LITIGATE DISPUTES
THROUGH A COURT, INCLUDING THE RIGHT TO LITIGATE CLAIMS ON
A CLASS-WIDE OR CLASS-ACTION BASIS, AND THAT YOU HAVE
EXPRESSLY AND KNOWINGLY WAIVED THOSE RIGHTS AND AGREED
TO RESOLVE ANY DISPUTES THROUGH BINDING ARBITRATION IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THIS SECTION.
Id.
182 Id. at 1071-72. See Brazil v. Dell Inc., No. C-07-01700 RMW, 2007 WL
2255296 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2007) (determining that Texas law cannot grant a class
action waiver to the arbitration clause because it would violate California public policy
and be substantively unconscionable as a "scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of
consumers" out of small dollar amounts).
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state of Florida, which was the principal place of business for Alienware, the
laptop vendor.' 8 3 The parties disputed whether Oestreicher ever agreed to the
clickwrap agreement terms of use because online consumers could order
defendant's notebook computers without actually having to access and read
the agreement's terms.184 Oestreicher brought a variety of claims against
Alienware contending that the company knew about the defects in the laptops
it sold. 185 In response to the lawsuit, Alienware motioned to compel
arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause and in accordance with the
Florida choice of law clause. 18 6
Applying California law and the Discover Bank analysis,' 8 7 the court
found that Oestreicher had minimally made out his claim of procedural
unconscionability since the clickwrap agreement was presented on a take-it-
or-leave-it basis without a chance for the consumer to negotiate the terms.188
However, the disputed amount was above $1,000, which may mean the
lawsuit did not involve a small dollar amount. 189 The court determined that
the purchase price was "not insignificant, but also not substantial," but
ultimately found that the second factor as to small dollar amounts was
adequately met. 190 Lastly, the court determined that the plaintiff had
sufficiently pled that Alienware knew and deliberately concealed the laptop
defects and failed to properly remedy the defects before selling the
computers. 191 The court decided that Oestreicher had satisfied this third
factor, which allowed the court to conclude that the preclusion of class action
arbitration in this instance violated public policy and showed "a high degree
of substantive unconscionability." 192 Therefore, the court determined that the
preclusion of class actions under the adhesive arbitration clause was an
unconscionable contract term and would not be enforced. 193
183 Oestreicher, 502 F. Supp. 2d at 1063-64.
184 Id. at 1063.
185 Id. at 1064. The plaintiff purchased the notebook laptop for $4,149 via
Alienware's website and asserted that the laptop overheated, shut down, and was no
longer operating about six months later. Id.
186 Oestreicher v. Alienware Corp., 502 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1064 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
187 Discover Bank v. Sup. Ct. of Los Angeles, 36 Cal. 4th 148, 162-63 (Cal. 2005).
188 Oestreicher, 502 F. Supp. 2d at 1067, 1070.
189 Id. at 1067-68.
190 Id. at 1068.
191 Id.
192 Oestreicher v. Alienware Corp., 502 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1070 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
193 Id. at 1071-72. The court found that the arbitration clause as a whole was
procedurally unconscionable, but not substantively unconscionable. Id. at 1070-71.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
In Fiser v. Dell Computer Corp.194 the New Mexico court faced the issue
of public policy in preventing online consumers from consolidating their
claims in an arbitral proceeding as well. The plaintiff bought a computer
from Dell's website.1 9 5 He later tried to bring a class action suit against Dell
claiming that the company had systematically misrepresented the size of their
computer memory in violation of New Mexico statutes and common law
principles. 196 The estimated loss due to the claimed misrepresentation, about
ten to twenty dollars per computer, played a central role in the court's review
of the online purchase agreement.1 97 The online agreement provided for the
application of Texas law and contained an arbitration clause that prevented
class actions in the arbitral forum. 198
The court recognized a well-established New Mexico public policy
outlined in its statutes that favored collective consumer action. 19 9 Unlike the
emphasis on small dollar amounts in the Discover Bank analysis,20 0 New
Mexico public policy promotes the vindication of consumer rights, regardless
of dollar amount.20 1 The New Mexico Uniform Arbitration Act explicitly
states that arbitration clauses that ban consumer participation in class action
arbitration proceedings are unenforceable and voidable.2 02 In addition, New
Mexico also values the class action as a key method for the "vindication of
the rights of groups of people who individually would be without effective
strength to bring their opponents into court at all."20 3 In turn, the court
Ultimately, Alienware indicated that striking the prohibition against collective action
under the arbitration clause would obviate its goal to use arbitration to handle its disputes.
Id. at 1071-72. Therefore, the court declared the entire arbitration clause unenforceable.
Id. at 1072.
194 Fiser v. Dell Computer Corp., 188 P.3d 1215 (N.M. 2008).
195 Id. at 1217.
196 Id. The plaintiff claimed violations of the New Mexico Unfair Practices Act
(UPA), the New Mexico False Advertising Act, and the New Mexico U.C.C., as well as
common law claims of breach of contract and warranty, misrepresentation, violations of
good faith and fair dealing, bad faith, and unjust enrichment. Id.
197 Id.
198 Id. at 1217-18.
199 Id. at 1218-19.
200 See supra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
201 Fiser v. Dell Computer Corp., 188 P.3d 1215, 1218 (N.M. 2008).
202 Id. at 1219.
203 Id. (quoting Romero v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 109 P.3d 768 (N.M. Ct. App. 2005)).
Reviewing U.S. Supreme Court precedent, the Fiser court recognized the importance of
class actions in helping to aggregate claims in a way that would permit consumers facing
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rejected the Texas choice of law clause because Texas law would uphold the
ban on class action in arbitration (as well as in litigation) which contradicted
existing New Mexico public policy. 20 4 However, a number of courts, some
even in California, have found that a bar on collective actions in arbitration
clauses in certain circumstances is not always against public policy and
thereby unconscionable. 20 5 This lack of consistency in court rulings as to
public policy and preclusion of consolidated arbitration actions leads both
users and online businesses to be confused about the validity of such
clauses. 206
small-dollar disputes to gain access to legal representation and preserve party resources.
Id. The court stated that the Supreme Court has indicated that:
[t]he policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the
problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to
bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights. A class action solves this problem
by aggregating the relatively paltry potential recoveries into something worth
someone's (usually an attorney's) labor.
Id. (quoting Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997)). Also, the Supreme
Court has recognized that: "[w]here it is not economically feasible to obtain relief within
the traditional framework of a multiplicity of small individual suits for damages,
aggrieved persons may be without any effective redress unless they may employ the
class-action device." Id. (quoting Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank, Jackson, Miss. v. Roper, 445
U.S. 326 (1980)).
204 Id.
205 See, e.g., Guadagno v. E*Trade Bank, 592 F. Supp. 2d 1263 (C.D. Cal. 2008)
(finding that an arbitration clause containing a class action waiver is not unconscionable
and not a contract of adhesion because the account holder in the online investment
service had sixty days to opt-out); Adler v. Dell Inc., No. 08-CV-13170, 2008 WL
5351042 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 18, 2008) (determining that an arbitration agreement
containing a class action waiver provision was enforceable under Texas law despite a
claim that the clause might discourage consumers from seeking legal redress for small
damage amounts in online computer purchases); In re Jamster Mktg. Litig., No.
05cv0819 JM(CAB), 2008 WL 4858506 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2008) (finding that a class
action waiver contained in a reasonable and clear arbitration provision is not
unconscionable under applicable Maryland, Mississippi, or Illinois laws, and compelling
arbitration of consumers' claims concerning deceptive business practices in the free
ringtone marketing scheme); Omstead v. Dell Corp., 473 F. Supp. 2d 1018 (N.D. Cal.
2007) (finding that, in online computer purchases, an arbitration clause with a class
action waiver is not substantively unconscionable under Texas law).
206 See infra note 225 and accompanying text.
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III. ESTABLISHING MINIMUM QUALITY STANDARDS FOR CLICKWRAP
DISPUTE RESOLUTION CLAUSES
In response to unconscionability challenges, some online businesses have
moved to revise their clickwrap dispute resolution clauses to offer more user-
friendly options, while others have continued to retain questionable clauses
that have been invalidated in prior court decisions. 207 For example, stung by
their legal challenges, both PayPal and Second Life 208 revised their
arbitration clauses to nearly identical terms. In response to the court
challenge, PayPal made efforts to make multiple cost-effective options
available to its users, allowing them to choose which one they would use in
resolving their online disputes.20 9 Under its revised terms, PayPal permits
users to litigate their claims in either Santa Clara County, California, or
Omaha, Nebraska, applying the laws of California,210 or to arbitrate damage
claims under $10,000. 211 For disputes involving small-dollar damage
amounts, users may select "a cost effective manner through binding non-
appearance-based arbitration" to resolve their claims. 212 The parties must
mutually agree upon the ADR provider, 213 but the arbitration process is
conducted solely at the user's option:
a) the arbitration shall be conducted by telephone, online and/or be
solely based on written submissions, the specific manner shall be chosen by
the party initiating the arbitration; b) the arbitration shall not involve any
207 See id.
208 Second Life, Terms of Service, § 12, http://secondlife.com/corporate/tos.php
(last visited Aug. 3 1, 2010) [hereinafter SL Terms].
209 PayPal User Agreement, § 14.2, https://cms.paypal.com/us/cgi-
bin/?&cmd=_render-content&content_ID=ua/UserAgreement full&locale.x-enUS#14
(last visited Jan. 31, 2010) [hereinafter PayPal Terms]. The clause states that:
[flor any claim (excluding claims for injunctive or other equitable relief) where
the total amount of the award sought is less than $10,000.00 USD, the party
requesting relief may elect to resolve the dispute in a cost effective manner through
binding non-appearance-based arbitration. If a party elects arbitration, that party will
initiate such arbitration through an established alternative dispute resolution (ADR)
provider mutually agreed upon by the parties.
Id.
2 10 Id. § 14.3.
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personal appearance by the parties or witnesses unless otherwise mutually
agreed by the parties; and c) any judgment on the award rendered by the
214
arbitrator may be entered in any court of competent jurisdiction.
Furthermore, the online payment service no longer contains clauses
precluding class actions or consolidated actions.215 PayPal also suggests that
users contact its customer service department first, either online or by
telephone, to help address user issues and to offer users "a neutral and cost
effective means of resolving the dispute quickly."2 16
In changing its terms of use, Second Life largely tracks the language of
PayPal's dispute resolution clauses. 217 The revised terms provide choice and
cost-sensitive options2 18 to its users who are no longer limited to mandatory
ICC arbitration in San Francisco. As with PayPal, users are allowed to
choose to litigate disputes in San Francisco, California or to arbitrate damage
claims under $10,000.219 Like PayPal, for disputes involving small dollar
damage amounts, users may also elect to use "binding non-appearance-based
arbitration" to handle their disputes. 220 The user and Second Life must
mutually agree upon the ADR provider; this change reflects the same basic
characteristic as the PayPal arbitral process.221
In Paypal and Bragg, unconscionability challenges clearly had an impact
on the dispute resolution terms in the clickwrap agreements that impacted
consumers throughout the U.S. But legal challenges to bars to collective
action under arbitration clauses have yielded a more spotty record. While
PayPal dropped its ban on collective action in its arbitration clause,
successful challenges in California and New Mexico to the clickwrap
agreements of Dell and Alienware did not cause Dell and Alienware to make
any meaningful change in their preclusion language.222 Both companies have
.214 Id.
215 Paypal Terms, supra note 211, § 14.2.
2 16 Id. § 14.1.
217 SL Terms, supra note 210, § 12.
218 Id. In its dispute resolution preamble, Linden declares that "[i]f a dispute arises
between you and Linden Lab ... [o]ur goal is to provide you with a neutral and cost-
effective means of resolving the dispute quickly." Id. § 12.1.
2 19 Id §§ 12.1-12.2.
220 Id. § 12.1.
221 Id. This clause is identical to PayPal's provisions.
222 See infra note 225 and accompanying text.
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retained arbitration clauses in their clickwrap agreements that bar collective
action in online user disputes. 223
The disagreement between courts on issues of unconscionability and
public policy makes it difficult for online businesses to uniformly and
efficiently process online consumer transactions across state borders. More
importantly, this discord sets up a two-tier system amongst online users in
different states who will continue to receive different levels of protection,
often regarding the exact same dispute resolution clauses in clickwrap
agreements. For example, online customers in California will typically retain
some level of choice between litigation and arbitration, elect arbitration
methods that take into account the dollar amounts of their disputes and the
fairness of the location, and be permitted to consider collective action in
arbitral proceedings in small dollar amount conflicts. Yet, Texas users who
agree to the same adhesive clauses cannot count on any of these protections
which in many cases results in no meaningful opportunity to vindicate their
rights in small-dollar disputes. While businesses may prefer these favorable
terms, users will be confused about their legal options and rights.224 In the
past, various ADR organizations put together guidelines for fair and effective
dispute resolution procedures and providers, with an emphasis on more
detailed disclosures to consumers; these proposed standards have not been
widely embraced. 225 In the context of unconscionability, Professor Leff
223 Despite its involvement in numerous legal challenges, Dell retains a Terms of
Sale provision containing an arbitration clause that prohibits collective action in
arbitration. The clause states:
In any dispute, NEITHER CUSTOMER NOR DELL SHALL BE ENTITLED
TO JOIN OR CONSOLIDATE CLAIMS BY OR AGAINST OTHER
CUSTOMERS, OR ARBITRATE ANY CLAIM AS A REPRESENTATIVE OR
CLASS ACTION OR IN A PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL CAPACITY. The
individual (non-class) nature of this dispute provision goes to the essence of the
parties' dispute resolution agreement, and if found unenforceable, the entire
arbitration and dispute resolution provision shall not be enforced.
Dell, U.S. Consumer Terms of Sale, § 12, http://www.dell.com (follow "Terms of Sale"
hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 31, 2010). Alienware's Terms and Conditions provision also
still precludes class action arbitration actions. Alienware, Alienware: Terms &
Conditions, § 11, http://www.alienware.com/purchase/customer-terms.aspx (last visited
Jan. 31, 2010).
224 Ponte, supra note 19, at 463-64.
2 25 See, e.g., National Arbitration Forum, Arbitration Bill of Rights with Commentary
(2007), http://www.adrforum.com/users/naf/resources/ArbitrationBillOfRights3.pdf (last
visited Jan. 31, 2010); American Arbitration Association, Consumer Due Process
Protocol: Statement of Principles of the National Consumer Disputes Advisory
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opined that standard form contracts for consumers were not true contracts,
but were more like "products" that should be required to meet basic
standards of quality.226 Professor Leff was highly critical of efforts to police
unconscionable consumer contracts through the courts, believing that a case-
by-case review leads to little or no change in the marketplace. 227 He
Committee, Consumer Due Process Protocol, (April 10, 1998),
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22019 (last visited Jan. 31, 2010); American Bar
Association Task Force on Ecommerce and ADR, Recommended Best Practices for
Online Dispute Resolution Service Providers (Aug. 2002),
http://www.abanet.org/dispute/documents/BestPracticesFinal 102802.pdf (last visited Jan.
31, 2010). See supra note 73 and accompanying text. See generally Ponte, supra note 19
(discussing and proposing minimum standards and online website disclosures for ODR).
Also, Professor Hillman further warns that mandating disclosure will not incentivize
consumers to compare contract terms and may result in "suspect terms" being adjudged
as enforceable. Hillman, supra note 4, at 839.
226 Leff, supra note 36, at 147; Leff, supra note 30, at 352 n.18. See Radin, supra
note 36, at 1139-40. Professor Margaret Jane Radin indicated that, in the online world
"[t]he contract is merging into the product; the text is merging into the functionality." Id.
at 1140.
227 Leff, supra note 30, at 356-58. He stated that:
[o]ne cannot think of a more expensive and frustrating course than to seek to
regulate goods or "contract" quality through repeated lawsuits against inventive
"wrongdoers.". . . Wouldn't it be better, finally, to face the political problems and
pass a statute that deals with... a wide panoply of [crooked] marketing devices, and
so on, and maybe even gross overpricing ... and tuck in, along with private causes
of action for the victims, an administrative enforcement arm to police these
repetitive nasty practices (and perhaps get compensation for the whole class of
bilked consumers theretofore identifiably bilked)? Isn't there some economy of scale
in that approach?
- The key factor I suppose, is that in dealing with mass vices in mass
contracts, administration by way of the litigation bureaucracy is likely to have only
trivial impact, for good or evil. One does not cure any serious breakdown in a
theoretically competitive market system by case-to-case sniping.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See infra note 229 and accompanying text. Similarly, law and
economics scholars have argued that terms that may appear onerous on their face are
often ignored in practice and contend that "[i]n some circumstances, a strategy of
discretionary protection [by businesses] is superior to a strategy of judicial discretion."
Bebchuk & Posner, supra note 125, at 7. But see Davis, supra note 5, at 598 (contending
that courts have been quite capable of adjudicating clickwrap disputes in a manner that
protects consumers from harsh terms while retaining the economic benefits of such
agreements).
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predicted that litigation might yield more explicit legal disclosures, but no
meaningful improvement in consumer understanding or contract fairness. 228
Analogizing to product safety, Professor Leff noted that government
regulation to quality needed to be limited "to important characteristics of the
product. '229 By looking at adhesion contracts as more similar to goods than
to traditional contracts, Professor Leff recommended that adhesion contracts
should be of "fair average quality. . . within the trade," 230 similar to the
earlier common law requirement for goods, which was subsequently codified
in the U.C.C. 231 Reflecting Professor Leffts perspective, it is important to
establish key minimum standards for clickwrap dispute resolution clauses
228 Leff, supra note 30, at 357-58. See Hillman, supra note 4, at 855; Speidel, supra
note 30, at 364 (emphasizing that detailed disclosures in contracts of adhesion are
unlikely to result in more informed consumer choice); Ben-Shahar, supra note 4, at 3-5.
Professor Robert A. Hillman adds that legislative bodies tend to focus on disclosure as
the. cure for unfair terms without realizing that this approach "may [put] consumers in a
worse position than the status quo and even forestall other attempts at reform." Hillman,
supra note 4, at 855. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. In addition, Professor
Michelle Boardman indicates that the ambiguous boilerplate language used today is
fashioned not to befuddle or defraud consumers, but to speak to judges who will apply
existing legal precedent to similar clauses with similar language. Michelle E. Boardman,
Contra Proferentem: The Allure of Ambiguous Boilerplate, in BOILERPLATE: THE
FOUNDATION OF MARKET CONTRACTS 176, 176-78 (Omri Ben-Shahar ed., 2007). She
states that:
[t]here is a hidden allure to ambiguous boilerplate, but the trick lies in the
courts, not the consumer. The trick is a private conversation between drafters and
courts; excused from the table is the consumer, who could have no fair duty to
understand and so has no duty to read. With the consumer out of the room, edits and
additions to boilerplate are targeted to courts alone. The new language does not need
to make sense to a layman. It does not even need to make sense standing alone; a
judge will read the language in the context of precedent, with the aid of briefing.
Id. at 176 (emphasis omitted). Boardman notes that insurance policies are a good
example of this legal conversation that excludes customers and focuses on addressing
anticipated judicial review. Id. at 181. She warned that courts need to recognize that
businesses are by-passing consumers in drafting complex boilerplate language and should
"be wary of creating perverse incentives to retain the very clauses that they seek to
change" in protecting consumers from onerous boilerplate provisions. Id. at 185.
229 Leff, supra note 30, at 353 n.19. See Leff, supra note 36, at 149-50.
230 Leff, supra note 36, at 151. See Leff, supra note 30, at 352 n.18; Ben-Shahar,
supra note 4, at 6.
231 Leff, supra note 30, at 356-58. This common law approach was later codified
under the U.C.C. as the concept of the implied warranty of merchantability. U.C.C. § 2-
314 (2001).
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that are drawn from case law determinations in order to avoid future judicial
findings of procedural and substantive unconscionability. 232 These minimum
standards must be augmented by simplified online disclosures that better
reflect the existing nature of website browsing as opposed to typical real
world review of paper contracts.233 An additional improvement would be to
use marketplace ratings or rankings of quality compliance in online
merchants' terms of use. These rankings, maintained by a consumer
trustmark organization, will help to improve marketplace competition and
improve the quality of clickwrap dispute resolution clauses. 234
In regards to procedural unconscionability, clickwrap agreements already
are often viewed as procedurally unconscionable because they are presented
on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. To ameliorate concerns about a clickwrap
agreement, the minimum standards must emphasize advance notice and
clarity of the dispute resolution terms in the contract formation stage. 235
Clear and conspicuous notice of the dispute resolution terms must be
provided prior to when users click on whether or not they agree to the terms
of use. 236 The minimum standards should also mandate that dispute
resolution terms should be written in plain English, and not be buried in fine
print or hidden in a mound of legalese. 237
To avoid claims of substantive unconscionability, clickwrap dispute
resolution clauses should emphasize mutuality, choice, cost-effectiveness,
and transparency. To address mutuality, online merchants should not reserve
a host of dispute resolution options for themselves while mandating the
users' process options.238 The terms of use should provide either comparable
options between the users and the merchant or opportunities to participate in
selecting the dispute resolution methods and qualified neutral
decisionmaker(s) who will help process their claims.239
It also makes good business sense to include an escalation clause that
recommends that consumers first seek to resolve the matter with the
merchant's customer service department, as found in the revised PayPal
terms of use, before moving on to more formal dispute resolution
232 See supra notes 84-117, 126-70 and accompanying text.
233 See supra notes 33, 78-83 and accompanying text.
234 See infra notes 282-87 and accompanying text.
235 See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
236 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
237 See supra notes 76, 79-80 and accompanying text.
238 See supra notes 126-41 and accompanying text.
239 See supra notes 211-23 and accompanying text.
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processes. 240 The online merchant should provide users with choices in their
dispute resolution methods that reflects the merchant's own dispute
resolution options under the clickwrap terms of use. 24 1 If the merchant
requires users to litigate or arbitrate, then the merchant should similarly limit
its dispute resolution options. 242 Yet, if the online business wishes to
maintain flexibility in its own dispute resolution methods, then it should
identify the user's options in the clickwrap agreement, typically litigation,
arbitration, or other appropriate ADR or ODR methods. 243
The online merchant should consider the expenses associated with
bringing a claim under the required or offered dispute resolution methods in
comparison to the typical dollar amounts in dispute.244 The available dispute
resolution methods should permit online consumers to resolve the actions in
their resident state or to handle them in more cost-effective, non-appearance-
based processes, such as telephone, e-mail, or web conferencing. 245 All costs
of the process, what portion of the cost each party will bear, and the terms of
payment should be spelled out in the terms of use and should not be so high
as to foreclose meaningful opportunities to resolve the dispute.246 In addition,
collective action in litigation or arbitration should be permitted in order to
more efficiently handle numerous small-dollar disputes. 247
To provide further transparency, the online merchant should publish
periodic statistical reports on dispute outcomes. 248 These public reports will
aid consumers in evaluating the likely value of litigation against potential
ADR or ODR proceedings.249 If arbitration is mandated, participants should
be encouraged to allow the publication of decisions, with any confidential or
proprietary information redacted from public review.250 With this approach,
both consumers and merchants will have access to earlier decisions that will
help balance the information gap between them derived from previously
240 See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
241 See supra notes 214-23 and accompanying text.
242 See supra notes 133-41 and accompanying text.
243 See supra notes 211-23 and accompanying text.
244 See supra notes 146-48, 158-65 and accompanying text.
245 See supra notes 216, 221 and accompanying text.
246 See supra notes 154-57, 177-81 and accompanying text.
247 See supra notes 175-208 and accompanying text.
248 Ponte, supra note 19, at 477. See supra notes 166-70 and accompanying text.
249 Ponte, supra note 19, at 477.
250 Id.
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successful claims and strategies under the mandated ADR or ODR
process.251
IV. SIMPLIFYING ONLINE DISCLOSURES AND ADOPTING A RATING
SYSTEM FOR CLICKWRAP DISPUTE RESOLUTION CLAUSES
Currently, most websites already provide conspicuous, advance notice of
their terms of use and very lengthy clauses on every aspect of the consumer
relationship, 252 including dispute resolution provisions. 253 In the wake of
unconscionability challenges, businesses are predictably moving toward
more detailed disclosures as suggested earlier by Professor Leff. Online
businesses are no different and typically provide a host of warnings to users
before they click their agreement to exhaustive terms of service. But more
comprehensive disclosures may not mean any more fairness or
understanding,254 and may actually be contrary to the typical browsing habits
of online users.255
For example, in Brazil v. Dell, Inc., the court struck down an arbitration
clause excluding consolidated actions as unconscionable. 256 On Dell's
website, a hyperlink allows users to review the terms of purchase in advance
with the cautionary language:
READ THIS DOCUMENT CAREFULLY! IT CONTAINS VERY
IMPORTANT INFORMATION ABOUT YOUR RIGHTS AND
OBLIGATIONS, AS WELL AS LIMITATIONS AND EXCLUSIONS
THAT MAY APPLY TO YOU. THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS A
DISPUTE RESOLUTION CLAUSE. 257
Also, in order to complete an online purchase, online buyers must click on
whether or not they agree or disagree, which prompts buyers with the
following warning:
251 Id. See supra notes 166-70 and accompanying text.
252 Friedman, supra note 2, at 398; Tasker & Pakcyk, supra note 4, at 143, 149.
253 See supra notes 96, 115 and accompanying text.
254 Becher, supra note 4, at 742-45. See Leff, supra note 30, at 355.
255 Hillman, supra note 4, at 840-41; Tasker & Pakcyk, supra note 4, at 105-06. See
supra note 33 and accompanying text.
256 Brazil v. Dell Inc., No. C-07-01700 RMW, 2007 WL 2255296, at *8 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 3, 2007).
257 Id. at *2.
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The Terms and Conditions of Sale contain very important information
about your rights and obligations as well as limitations and exclusions that
may apply to you. They contain limitations of liability and warranty
information. They also contain an agreement to resolve disputes through
arbitration rather than through litigation. Please read them carefully.2 58
Despite ominous warnings found on websites, few users ever read
clickwrap agreements 259 even though online consumers may have more
information at their disposal, 260 such as explanatory FAQs, and less time
pressure to review contracts of adhesion at leisure at home than those
standing at the counter of a brick-and-mortar business.2 61 While online users
have the opportunity to print, read, and review clickwrap agreements,
26 2
258 Id. at *1.
259 Friedman, supra note 2, at 378. See Leff, supra note 30, at 351; supra note 4 and
accompanying text. Professor Stephen E. Friedman accurately states that:
Consumers making purchases on the Internet are well practiced at scrolling
through and "agreeing" to "Terms and Conditions" with extraordinary speed and
extraordinarily little thought. These terms frequently include an arbitration provision
that deprives the consumer of the right to sue if a dispute arises. The combination of
a significant contract provision with a particularly problematic method of contract
formation raises serious problems for consumers and for contract law. These
problems are exacerbated by the increasing likelihood that the consumer will be
viewing and agreeing to on-line contract terms not through the large screen of a
desktop computer, but rather through the tiny screen of a cell phone or similar
device.
Friedman, supra note 2, at 378; Hillman, supra note 4, at 843--44, 852.
260 Professor Becher recognized the difficulty of imperfect information in consumer
contract situations and the tendency of consumers not to read standard form agreements.
Becher, supra note 4, at 733-34. He opined that:
[f]ighting the tendency of consumers not to read contracts and coping with
asymmetric information have a lot in common. Most people do not bother reading
SFCs; therefore, inefficient terms, which benefit the drafters, are more likely to be
incorporated. Similarly, efficient clauses that benefit the adherent party are less
likely to be included where SFCs are not being read. If adherent parties were more
inclined to read the contracts, these inefficiencies would be much less common and
acute. In this sense, imposing a duty to read on consumers may arguably reduce
asymmetric information, as long as consumers can understand the SFCs they read.
Id.
261 Hillman, supra note 4, at 840, 852; Kunz et al., supra note 10, at 290.
262 Hillman, supra note 4, at 840; Kunz et al., supra note 10, at 290; Tasker &
Pakcyk, supra note 4, at 114. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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online agreements are often excessively lengthy263 and squeezed into small
pop-up windows that are difficult to read.264 Website design principles also
focus on the consumer's scanning of web pages, rather than reading each
word of text, 265 and aim to entertain and divert the user's attention away
from the mundane terms of use. 266 Furthermore, the casualness of
communications on laptops and other hand-held devices detracts from the
seriousness of contract formation that the signing of tangible paper
documents may reinforce in consumers' minds in the real world. 267 In
addition, law and economics scholars suggest that online consumers are
acting efficiently by not reading these online contracts, despite the common
law duty to read, since they seldom understand the legalese in online
contracts and have no opportunity to negotiate the terms.268
Therefore, assembling minimum standards of quality for clickwrap
dispute resolution clauses will be useless if they are simply buried in a maze
of legalistic clauses. In the online world, disclosure needs to be simplified to
reflect common user browsing habits and web design approaches which
create content and shape the user experience. 269 Since web design promotes
users scanning information and quickly grasping key components of website
content, 270 online disclosures need to reflect this reality. In an effort to
forward Professor Leff's interest in building a "better cabinet,"271 two basic
methods might prove useful: (1) the presentation of simple tables at the start
263 Friedman, supra note 2, at 398.
264 Id.; Tasker & Pakcyk, supra note 4, at 100, 108-09.
265 Tasker & Pakcyk, supra note 4, at 105-06. The authors contend that courts often
fail to recognize important distinctions between online clickwrap agreements and
standard paper contracts based on the "technical nuances" in web design. Id at 105-06,
109-10. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
266 See supra notes 33, 264 and accompanying text.
267 Friedman, supra note 2, at 398-99; Hillman, supra note 4, at 841.
268 Becher, supra note 4, at 729-31, 733-34; Hillman, supra note 4, at 839-41;
O'Hara, supra note 4, at 1920-21; Ben-Shahar, supra note 4, at 5. See Senderowicz,
supra note 19, at 277-79 (suggesting that form agreements containing arbitration clauses
should clearly identify the procedural differences between litigation and arbitration, as
well as negotiate financial incentives with consumers who agree to elect arbitration);
supra note 140 and accompanying text.
269 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
270 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
271 See Leff, supra note 36, at 157. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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of an online agreement or site FAQs,272 and (2) the creation of a trustmark
ratings system for dispute resolution clauses in online consumer
transactions. 273
The first approach is to simplify the presentation of the key
characteristics of the clickwrap dispute resolution clauses using a simple
table using plain English text.274 The table would appear in the agreement
dialog box at the start of the online agreement 275 or in the site's FAQs
section. 276 The table would briefly outline the basics of dispute resolution
clauses to aid consumer understanding and comparison of the dispute
resolution options with those found on other sites. A consumer trustmark
organization, such as the Better Business Bureau Online (BBBOnline) 277 or
Consumer Reports, 278 might prepare a list of standard questions that would
appear in the dispute resolution tables to help establish online conventions
that would make the dispute resolution comparison process easier for
consumers.279 A potential example is illustrated in Exhibit 1 below.
272 See Ben-Shahar, supra note 4, at 32 (suggesting that any boilerplate labeling
needs to be in "easily readable formats," similar to food and nutritional labels, and should
uniformly summarize key contract terms); infra notes 276-84 and accompanying text.
273 See infra notes 279-84, 293-94 and accompanying text.
274 See Ben-Shahar, supra note 4, at 26; supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
275 See, e.g., Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996) (holding that
the FAA supersedes "Montana's first-page notice requirement," which requires that an
ADR clause be underlined, capitalized, and located on first page of contract).
276 See Ponte, supra note 19, at 455.
277 See Better Business Bureau, Welcome to BBBOnLine,
http://www.bbb.org/online (last visited Feb. 1, 2010) (official website of Better Business
Bureau).
278 See ConsumerReports.org, Consumer Reports: Expert Product Reviews and
Product Ratings from Our Test Labs, http://www.consumerreports.org (last visited Feb.
1, 2010) (official website of Consumer Reports).
279 See Ben-Shahar, supra note 4, at 32-33. Professor Richard Craswell indicated
that disclosure rules should focus on important aspects of an agreement, but not "on
every conceivable topic." Richard Craswell, Taking Information Seriously:
Misrepresentation and Nondisclosure in Contract Law and Elsewhere, 92 VA. L. REV.
555, 577 (2006). He recommended the prioritization of key aspects of contract disclosure
and the development of standard formats, similar to nutritional labeling, to aid consumer
comparisons of contract terms which cannot be easily accomplished when relying on
case-by-case judicial determinations. Id. at 577-78, 593. He added that "otherwise
adequate warning might be rendered ineffective by inadequate formatting." Id. at 584-85.
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Exhibit 1 - Sample Clickwrap Dispute Resolution Disclosure Table
IF I HAVE A DISPUTE ABOUT MY ONLINE WHERE
PURCHASE, AMIABLE TO... IS IT?
get help from customer service? § 2.0
go to court in my resident state? T- § 7.0
choose method for resolving my claim outside of / § 8.1
courts?
attend dispute resolution sessions in my resident ,j § 8.2
state?
help pick a qualified neutral third party § 8.3
decisionmaker?
review the rules of dispute resolution process? § 9.0
resolve my dispute using telephone conferencing? T § 9.1
resolve my dispute using e-mail submissions? § 9.2
resolve my dispute using online or web " § 9.3
conferencing?
participate in a class action with other consumers
with similar / § 9.4
disputes or consumer groups?
seek punitive and other non-economic damages? _ _ § 10
find average costs for resolving my claim outside FAQ -
of courts? #11
review past reports on outcomes of earlier FAQ -
disputes? #12
However, some consumers may have difficulty effectively assessing and
comparing the dispute resolution information contained in the proposed
table.280 The consumers may not have enough understanding of dispute
resolution processes or may find it hard to weigh the values of different
dispute resolution options 281 loaded with contingencies they may never
use.
282
280 Ben-Shahar, supra note 4, at 18-19, 26-27. See supra notes 140, 270 and
accompanying text.
281 The general public still lacks sufficient information about, and experience with,
ADR and ODR to make informed judgments about appropriate methods of dispute
resolution. See Cathy A. Costantino & Christina Sickles Merchant, Designing Conflict
Management Systems-A Guide To Creating Productive and Healthy Organizations, in
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: STRATEGIES FOR LAW AND BuSINESS 1259, 1264,
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Professor Leff contended that legislative action and administrative
enforcement against abusive consumer practices were the better approach to
dealing with unconscionability in mass-produced consumer contracts of
adhesion. 283 Yet, efforts to spell out special requirements for clickwrap
dispute resolution clauses would run afoul of the FAA's requirement that
arbitration clauses be treated the same as other contracts284 and E-SIGN's
call for equality between offline and online contracts.285
Therefore, it would be useful to have a market-based approach to the
issue of adequate compliance with minimum quality standards. 286 Rating
systems utilizing alphabetical or percentage grades or star systems are
common on the internet, including the use of online evaluations of law
firms. 287 Online consumers are used to scanning and relying upon these
1266 (E. Wendy Trachte Huber & Stephen K. Huber eds., 1996) (outlining that one major
principle of ADR is to "[m]ake sure that disputants have the necessary knowledge and
skill to choose and use ADR"); Robert C. Bordone, Electronic Online Dispute
Resolution: A Systems Approach-Potential, Problems, and a Proposal, 3 HARV. NEGOT.
L. REv. 175, 196 (1998) (recognizing that there are major challenges in offering simple
dispute resolution processes to deal with conflicts); Lucille M. Ponte, Throwing Bad
Money After Bad: Can Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) Really Deliver the Goods for
the Unhappy Internet Shopper?, 3 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 55, 90-91 (2001)
(noting that the "lack of public awareness and education about ADR principles and
methods" is a major obstacle in public confidence in and use of ADR and ODR); Ben-
Shahar, supra note 4, at 21.
282 See Leff, supra note 36, at 148; Leff, supra note 30, at 351; Ben-Shahar, supra
note 4, at 18. In the unconscionability context, Professor Leff recognized that consumers
often lack the ability to adequately assess boilerplate contingencies in form contracts.
Leff, supra note 36, at 148. See Hillman, supra note 4, at 841, 850. Furthermore,
Professor Hillman also warned that the average consumer tends "to equate 'low
probability' risks with 'zero probability' risks." Id. at 841. See supra notes 20, 140, 228,
262 and accompanying text.
283 Leff, supra note 30, at 356-58. See supra notes 135, 216, 221 and accompanying
text.
284 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
285 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
286 See infra notes 289-94 and accompanying text.
287 See Stephanie Francis Ward, Grade Anxiety: Firms Fret About Clients Rating
Their Work, 96 A.B.A.J. 48 (2010), available at http://www.abajoumal.com
/magazine/article/grade anxiety (addressing the legal community's concerns about client
review and peer-endorsement rating sites for law firms). But see Ben-Shahar, supra note
4, at 31-33 (suggesting the possible use of a rating system but wondering whether the
lack of rating systems for e-commerce contracts may indicate a lack of consumer demand
for such ratings in lower cost online business transactions as compared to real world
transactions involving lending, mortgages, car purchases, and residential leases).
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online rating conventions in making determinations about their online
purchasing practices. 288 Some rating systems are based on consumer ratings
while others may be a mix of peer endorsement and customer reviews,289
with unsophisticated consumers looking to more savvy consumers to point
out flaws in form agreements, such as onerous dispute resolution clauses. 290
288 A recent JupiterResearch study found that 77% of online consumers will review
user ratings and reviews, and 66% will consider online consumer purchasing
recommendations before making online purchases. Study Finds Consumers Rely on
Ratings, Reviews and Recommendations During Recession, Feb. 26, 2009,
http://www.emarketingandcommerce.com/article/study-fmds-consumers-rely-ratings-
reviews-and-recommendations-during-recession (last visited Nov. 24, 2010). Other
studies show that a majority of online consumers will rely on user ratings to make
purchasing decisions and will pay higher prices for products that garnered better
consumer ratings. Press Release, PRWeb, Consumers Turn to Online Ratings and
Reviews, as Sites Respond to Concerns (Feb. 28, 2008), available at
http://www.prweb.com/releases/2008-02-28/ratings/prweb729043.htm. See Ben-Shahar,
supra note 4, at 28-30.
289 Ben-Shahar, supra note 4, at 28-30. See, e.g., ConsumerSearch.com, Product
Reviews and Reports, http://www.consumersearch.com (last visited Feb. 1, 2010)
(aggregating and analyzing product reviews and making product recommendations);
Edmunds.com, New Cars, Used Cars, Car Reviews and Pricing,
http://www.edmunds.com (last visited Feb. 1, 2010) (acting as a website that provides
both expert and consumer ratings on new and used vehicles); Epinions.com, Reviews
from Epinions, http://www.epinions.com (last visited Feb. 1, 2010) (acting as a website
that collects opinions and reviews of consumers on best products and services, and
provides price comparisons and ratings of online shopping websites). See Ben-Shahar,
supra note 4, at 30. Professor Ben-Shahar suggests that perhaps free downloadable
software could be developed to help analyze boilerplate provisions (hypothetically
"EULAlyzer"). Id. However, he recognizes the difficulty in creating a methodology for
assessing the value of a variety of e-commerce clauses for individual consumers. Id. at
29.
290 See Baird, supra note 125, at 133. Professor Douglas G. Baird notes that:
[b]uyers often have little choice over the way that a particular seller bundles her
product. The inability to choose is a by-product of mass production. Furthermore,
the typical buyer cannot rely on her own expertise or her ability to dicker with her
seller. But when the market works effectively, she can rely on the presence of other,
more sophisticated buyers. As long as there are enough sophisticated buyers aware
of the importance of having the right product attributes and the right legal terms, the
seller must provide those. Thus, at first approximation, boilerplate is something the
typical consumer can safely ignore most of the time. Even if the boilerplate is buried
in fine print and written in ancient Greek, as long as the consumer can observe that
knowledgeable buyers are satisfied with products that contain this boilerplate, she
can be too.
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However, in the specialized realm of dispute resolution clauses, a
consumer trustmark organization would be better suited to objectively
evaluate and rate dispute resolution clauses contained in online merchants'
terms of use for compliance with the proposed minimum quality
standards.291 Similar to what is already done with other product or service
ratings online, the organization would provide a rating of, or grade on, a
particular online merchant's compliance with the minimum quality standards
for dispute resolution clauses present in the merchant's terms of use. The
score or rating would appear on the online merchant's homepage or at the
start of the dialog box containing the clickwrap agreement. In addition, the
trustmark organization could provide updates on merchant ratings through a
blog or in downloadable reports for consumer review and use in their online
activities. Consumers would be allowed to post their own experiences
resolving a dispute with an online merchant in a database searchable by the
online merchant's name. E-businesses with high scores or ratings would
trumpet their user-friendly dispute resolution provisions to consumers to try
to gain an advantage in the marketplace. Those online merchants with low
scores or ratings might become more motivated to improve the quality of
their clickwrap dispute resolution clauses in order to more effectively
compete against other higher-rated online merchants. 292
V. CONCLUSION
Id. However, Professor Hillman warns that some markets which lack sufficient
competition will allow businesses to lay down harsh terms, assuming that they will lose
only a "small cadre of readers and dictate onerous terms to the nonreaders." Hillman,
supra note 4, at 843.
291 Currently, the Better Business Bureau has established the BBBOnLine
Reliability Program which provides a trustmark for online businesses that comply with its
code of responsible online commercial conduct. Better Business Bureau, Reliability
Program Requirements, http://www.bbbonline.org/reliability/requirement_small.asp (last
visited Feb. 5, 2010). Under the BBBOnLine trustmark program, the e-business must
agree to participate in the BBB's conflict resolution programs which involve informal
hearings before volunteer hearing officers or binding arbitration under the BBB Rules of
Arbitration. BBBOnLine, Dispute Resolution, http://www.bbbonline.org/reliability/dr.asp
(last visited Feb. 5, 2010). E-businesses may select their own ADR/ODR provider as long
as that process meets certain BBB criteria on party assent, transparency, fairness, and
impartiality. Id. See Ponte, supra note 19, at 461-64.
292 Hillman, supra note 4, at 845-46. See supra notes 272-73 and accompanying
text.
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Case-by-case battles over online dispute resolution clauses have yielded
inconsistent results and slow progress toward improving fundamental
fairness for consumers. Efforts to expand disclosures in terms of use provide
mainly legal notice to consumers who seldom read them or cannot
sufficiently understand the legalese in order to assess their dispute resolution
options. These adhesive clauses should be viewed not as contracts, but
products that should meet certain minimum quality standards. These basic
standards should address mutuality, choice, cost-effectiveness, and
transparency in offering dispute resolution options in clickwrap agreements.
It is beneficial to present a simple chart that explains the essential
characteristics of the dispute resolution clause and provides essential
information in plain English for consumer comparisons. In addition, a simple
rating system by a trustmark organization should be established to rank or
grade clauses, providing a quick snapshot of information in line with typical
online browsing behavior. Together, these proposals will help to elevate the
overall quality of dispute resolution clauses contained in terms of use as
online merchants compete for better ratings. Without these fundamental and
straightforward changes, online dispute resolution clauses in clickwrap
agreements will be unlikely to shake their bad rap in the online world.
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